Making sense of absorption capacity within the EU: a study of the concept : history, clarification, assessment by Hjelmesæth, Ida
Making sense of Absorption 
Capacity within the EU: a study 
of the concept  




Department of Political Science 






The process of writing this thesis has been both a challenging and rewarding experience. My 
interest in the subject was sparked during my time at the Department of Government and 
International Affairs at the University of Durham (England). 
I wish to thank the following for their help; firstly, my tutor Ulf Sverdrup for his advice and 
assistance (V06, H06, V07). My second debt of gratitude is owed to my father, Jøran 
Hjelmesæth, for providing intellectual and moral support, offering valuable help. I also wish 
to thank Matthew McGee for proof reading and useful comments on drafts. It would be 
amiss of me not to mention my fellow students and friends Yngvild Herje Arnesen and 
Yngvild Prydz for making my days at university a memorable experience, as well as 
academically rewarding. My final note of thanks goes to my family for their unconditional 
support throughout. 
Finally, I recognise that any mistakes made in the course of this thesis are of my own 
making. 
Word count: 34 733 
 










1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND AIM OF THE THESIS .........................................................................9 
1.2 ABSORPTION CAPACITY – INTRODUCING THE TERM...............................................................12 
1.3 CONTEXT: ENLARGEMENT FATIGUE IN THE EU – THE REVIVAL OF ABSORPTION CAPACITY .14 
1.4 OPERATIONALISATIONS OF TERMS .........................................................................................18 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS....................................................................................19 
1.5.1 Absorption capacity as a qualitative case study .........................................................19 
1.5.2 Empirical Sources.......................................................................................................21 
1.5.3 Reliability and Validity ...............................................................................................22 
2. LESSONS FROM THE PAST: ENLARGING THE UNION IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCERNS 
RELATING TO ABSORPTION CAPACITY.................................................................................24 
2.1 FIRST ENLARGEMENT OF 1973: DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ................27 
2.2 SECOND AND THIRD ENLARGEMENTS OF 1981 AND 1986: GREECE, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL..29 
2.3 FOURTH ENLARGEMENT OF 1995: AUSTRIA, FINLAND, AND SWEDEN....................................33 
2.4 THE ABSENCE OF CONCERNS RELATING TO ABSORPTION CAPACITY ......................................36 
3. CONTEMPORARY ENLARGEMENTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ABSORPTION 
CAPACITY AS A CONCEPT...........................................................................................................37 
3.1 FIFTH ENLARGEMENT 2004: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPANSION ......................39 
3.2 MOST RECENT ENLARGEMENTS OF 2007: BULGARIA AND ROMANIA ....................................44 
3.3 FURTHER POSSIBLE EXPANSION: THE CASE OF TURKEY.........................................................47 
3.4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ABSORPTION CAPACITY PROBLEM .................................................50 
 6 
4. HANDLING THE PROBLEM OF ABSORPTION CAPACITY – CLARIFICATION AND 
DEFINITION ..................................................................................................................................... 56 
4.1 THE COMMISSION’S ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY AND MAIN CHALLENGES 2006 – 2007 REPORT57 
4.1.1 The Commission’s proposed measures ...................................................................... 59 
4.1.2 The Commission’s Conclusions ................................................................................. 62 
4.2 THE PARLIAMENT’S RESOLUTION ON THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE EU’S CAPACITY TO 
INTEGRATE NEW MEMBER STATES.................................................................................................... 64 
4.2.1 The Parliament’s proposed measures ........................................................................ 66 
4.2.2 Conclusions of the resolution..................................................................................... 68 
4.3 ABSORPTION CAPACITY AND THE MEDIA.............................................................................. 69 
4.3.1 How absorption capacity is defined and understood ................................................. 70 
4.3.2 Absorption capacity; a problem or a pseudo-problem? ............................................ 71 
4.4 INSIDE THE CORE OF ABSORPTION CAPACITY: LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS ................ 75 
4.4.1 Legitimacy.................................................................................................................. 76 
4.4.2 Effectiveness............................................................................................................... 81 
4.4.3 Conclusion: legitimacy and effectiveness................................................................... 83 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ABSORPTION CAPACITY IN THE EU.......................... 85 
5.1 LEGITIMACY – EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS.......................................................................... 88 
5.1.1 Political, social, and economic concerns................................................................... 90 
5.1.2 Legitimacy in the EU.................................................................................................. 94 
5.2 EFFECTIVENESS – INTERNAL MARKET SCOREBOARD............................................................ 94 
5.2.1 The Internal Market Scoreboard................................................................................ 96 
5.2.2 Effectiveness of the EU............................................................................................... 98 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 99 
7. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ 104 
 7 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is now experiencing a particular challenge revolving 
around the fundamental problems posed by enlargement to the governing of the 
Union. The debate is more specifically over the EU’s capacity to act effectively with 
an increased membership base and with the continual support of its citizens. At the 
core of these problems are concerns over the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU 
as an enlarged Union, and from this, the term absorption capacity has emerged in 
popular EU discourse. This has introduced a new discussion regarding the Union’s 
ability, or as some would argue, inability, to allow new members into the EU 
(Economist 2006). Although earlier enlargements did generate certain similar 
concerns among the members of the Union, absorption capacity was never a 
prominent concept in the discourse before the eastern enlargement of 2004. 
Subsequently, there has been puzzlement regarding the introduction of absorption 
capacity into the EU debates. Resulting from calls for clarification, there have been 
recent attempts from the EU to define and explore the meaning of the term. 
I will in this thesis investigate the term absorption capacity, its meaning, usage, and 
its implications for the Union. Based on the assessment of the early enlargements 
from 1972 onwards and up to 2003, with the introduction of the idea of an eastern 
enlargement, I will argue that the issue of absorption capacity was hardly discussed, 
or even mentioned in the debates over enlargement of the EU. Moreover, when 
concerns were raised, this attracted limited attention; these concerns were vaguely 
defined and had a limited impact on the accession of the new states. 
This situation changed radically with the enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe. 
Absorption capacity was brought into the enlargement debate and attracted 
considerable attention, and there is a tendency that the term may be used increasingly 
in the discourse surrounding future enlargements. Given that attempts have now been 
made to deal with absorption capacity in a more systematic manner, I shall 
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empirically examine these efforts made by the Commission and the European 
Parliament to clarify and define the term. 
In the final section of this thesis, I will tentatively consider the actual level of 
absorption capacity in the EU in relation to the key issues of legitimacy and 
effectiveness. Concerns of legitimacy shall be assessed by analysing Eurobarometer 
surveys, and the effectiveness of the EU on the basis of the Internal Market 
Scoreboard, measuring the degree of effectiveness of the member states in 
transposing and implementing EU decisions. Following from this analysis, I will 
argue that the absorption capacity of the EU, based on these measures at least, seems 
to be unaffected.  
The term absorption capacity was first mentioned in EU discourse when the criteria 
for membership were established in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. This states that 
“Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union (…). The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.”1  
Consequently, the term has become descriptive of the Union’s supposed ability to 
take in new member states, vis-à-vis the readiness of the new member states 
themselves. The sudden burst of interest in absorption capacity could, according to 
the Economist (2006), prove ‘misleading, dishonest and damaging’ for the EU, not 
least due to the lack of explanatory attempts at defining the phrase. Following these 
concerns for a heuristic clarity of the concept, pressure mounted for an official 
clarification of absorption capacity. According to the Copenhagen Criteria; if a 
potential candidate state voices interest in becoming a part of the community, and 
fulfils these certain criteria, that state should consequently be given accession to the 
EU.  In this respect, the capacity of the EU to absorb new member states seems to 
                                              
1 European Council in Copenhagen June 21 – 22 1993, Presidency Conclusions.  
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have been of secondary importance (Economist 2006). Yet, the discussion regarding 
this lacks clarity.  
1.1 Research question and aim of the thesis 
Enlargement of the EU will as such be the central topic for the subsequent discussion, 
based around the 2004 and the 2007 enlargements. This wave of enlargement has 
been seen in some quarters to have led to the sense of exhaustion fatigue that 
pervades around the EU. Following from this, the phrase absorption capacity was 
brought into EU discourse. Discussions within European Union studies often revolve 
around so-called buzz words, allowing academics to further our knowledge based on 
an analysis of the concepts. In the recent past, there have been a number of such buzz 
words in EU discourse, most notably subsidiarity (Blichner and Sangolt 1994, 
Føllesdal 1998), and flexibility (Stubb 2002). This thesis can be seen in parallel to 
these, as an investigation into a popularised new buzz word and its meaning.  
The concept of absorption capacity as explained in this, does not automatically fit 
into any overarching theory of the EU, and the discussion does neither deductively 
follow from a particular theoretic starting point. As such, the discussion will not be 
grounded in one particular theoretic perspective. Instead, the investigation is of an 
inductive nature, taking its starting point as the resurgence of the concept of 
absorption capacity. The theoretical discussion will as such instead concentrate on 
conceptualisations of effectiveness and legitimacy, which are seen to be at the core of 
the term. 
My argument suggests that the enlargements prior to that of 2004 did not lead to 
discussions over absorption capacity, but that this was brought into the discussion at 
the time of the major expansion to the East. The purpose of my investigation is to 
discuss and understand the concept of absorption capacity, the difficulties 
surrounding it and its implications for the Union. How successfully do questions of 
the EU’s legitimacy and effectiveness explain the resurgence of the term, and do 
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either take precedence in the discussions of enlargement? My work will start from the 
position that absorption capacity questions the EU’s capacity to govern with a 
substantially increased member state base. With possibilities for further expansions 
still, how does the EU’s ability to govern in the best possible way interact with how 
effectively and legitimately this is achieved?  
The objective of this study therefore is an investigation into the concept of absorption 
capacity within the EU, understood through a history of enlargement, before 
clarifying the meaning of the concept in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness, and 
then proceeding finally to assess empirically the current absorption capacity of the 
Union. More specifically, the research question asks; how can absorption capacity 
be understood in the context of European enlargement, in terms of legitimacy 
and effectiveness, and what is the current state of it when empirically measured? 
The significance of absorption capacity in EU discourse is reflected in the fact that 
both the Commission and the European Parliament have now made considerable 
efforts to clarify the term. Their approaches will be discussed in the following. I shall 
argue, following these efforts, that absorption capacity is to a considerable degree a 
result of concerns over the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the EU. Subsequently, 
an evaluation of the actual situation of absorption capacity will follow, using 
Eurobarometer surveys and the Internal Market Scoreboard to tentatively measure 
this. In this sense, it may be questioned if absorption capacity is such a pressing 
matter after all and if the feeling of fatigue is grounded in real problems that the EU 
faces? It will be argued that the absorption capacity of the EU is not as problematic as 
the discourse indicates. 
It shall be argued that one cannot entirely reject the concept of absorption capacity 
simply because it suggests that the EU is a club and not a network. I will argue 
contrary to this that although absorption capacity does not convey the entire nature of 
the EU, the current set of enlargement debates have shown that in practical terms, 
membership of the EU is not open, and in this sense the EU does appear to have club, 
as well as network, characteristics. 
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The hypotheses underlying the discussion suggest that the stronger the sense of 
legitimacy, the more extensive absorption capacity inherent in the EU will be. It shall 
also be shown that, the larger the degree of effectiveness, the larger the degree of 
absorption capacity within the EU. 
There are a number of limitations within this thesis. Firstly, there are concerns over 
how to measure an abstract concept like absorption capacity. The discussion and 
focus that is suggested will deal with general capacity issues, and the timeline chosen 
focuses on the years from 2003 to 2007. The Eurobarometer surveys that have been 
used for this discussion have not yet been released in their entirety due to the short 
time that has passed since they were published, and therefore the discussion is based 
on crude measures, on the descriptive explanations of these findings. This has meant 
that what would have proved interesting in variations in the different variables, has 
proved technically impossible to perform, as these will subsequently be released in 
full at a future date.  
The EU and its development and functioning are the focus of European integration 
studies, a branch of the field which has traditionally attempted to explain European 
integration in one comprehensive, theoretical model. The so-called grand integration 
theories, or ‘middle range’ theories (Rosamond 2000:108), of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, have been the dominant theories in studies of the EU’s 
development. Recently, the research of multi-level governance has questioned the 
logic of these grand theories, challenging the notion that one theory alone can 
satisfactorily account for the complexity revolving European development. Yet, the 
overarching theoretical perspectives on European integration seem ill-fitting to my 
investigation into absorption capacity. The discussion will therefore be based upon a 
theoretic discussion of legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The structure of this thesis is arranged as follows; chapter one introduces the 
phenomenon of absorption capacity and provides methodological considerations, 
chapter two discusses the enlargements from 1972 up until 1995, where the EU’s 
absorption capacity was not a part of the discourse. Chapter three argues that 
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absorption capacity followed from the idea of the enlargement to the East. Chapter 
four contains a conceptual discussion of absorption capacity, focusing on the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the media’s take on absorption capacity, 
followed by a discussion of the theoretics behind legitimacy and effectiveness. 
Chapter five contains a tentative evaluation of empirical findings of absorption 
capacity. Conclusionary comments are presented in chapter six. 
1.2 Absorption Capacity – Introducing the term 
Absorption capacity first entered the EU discourse following extensive pressure from 
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)2 that the EC set out conditions 
for future enlargements as well as time prospectuses for these. The European Council 
meeting in Lisbon of June 1992 requested that the Commission should evaluate the 
progress and the future development of partnership with the CEECs (Skålnes 
2005:219). In a report from December 1992, the Commission recognized the 
importance of the security dimension, and the benefits of the inclusion of these 
countries into the coherent security structure of the EC. The European Council 
meeting in Edinburgh December 1992 postponed the decision of potential 
enlargement, to the Copenhagen Council meeting in June 1993 where the 
Commission’s proposal that membership would be granted as soon as the countries 
fulfilled the economic and political conditions was set out. Notably, two additional 
conditions were introduced; firstly that the EC would have the capacity to accept and 
absorb the new members, and secondly, that the enlargement would not challenge 
further European integration (ibid). 
The uncertainties regarding absorption capacity led to calls for a specific definition 
and clarification of the term from an official EU perspective. The Commission met 
this by publishing a report in November last year (2006), titled Enlargement Strategy 
                                              
2 Central- and Eastern European Countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta. 
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and Main Challenges for 2006 – 2007, where attempts were made to define and make 
sense of the problematics regarding enlargement. In December 2006, the European 
Parliament presented their views in a resolution on the institutional aspects of the 
European Union’s capacity to integrate new Member States (2006/2226(INI)).  
The discussion will show how absorption capacity can be seen to encompass both 
legitimacy and effectiveness.  
Table 1.1. Absorption capacity 
  Effectiveness 
  High Low 
High Large Seminar Legitimacy 
Low Elitist Small 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates that a high degree of effectiveness combined with a high degree 
of legitimacy may be said to constitute a large degree of absorption capacity. 
Conversely, a low degree of effectiveness teamed with a low degree of legitimacy, 
illustrates a small degree of absorption capacity. A lower degree of effectiveness 
combined with a high degree of legitimacy converges to the notion of absorption 
capacity as a seminar, whereas a high degree of effectiveness and a low degree of 
legitimacy together account for a more elitist perspective on absorption capacity. A 
low degree of effectiveness would imply that all member states implement fewer 
policies, and additionally that the variation in the overall implementation is widely 
spread; ie member states do not implement the same directives. A high degree of 
effectiveness would suggest the opposite, namely that the degree of implementation is 
high or at least at the same level as before the eastern enlargements. Secondly, the 
variation in the implementation is low between the member states. A high degree of 
legitimacy would suggest widespread support in the EU for the enlargement project. 
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1.3 Context: Enlargement Fatigue in the EU – the Revival 
of Absorption Capacity  
Absorption capacity has re-emerged in EU discourse within a political environment 
holding a pessimistic tone. Crisis, fatigue, collapse, loss of direction, and threats are 
all part of this discourse. Although there may be several factors contributing to this, 
the most immediate one seems to be enlargement (Meyer et al 2004:90). The 
connection between this sense of crisis and enlargement fatigue seems a logical one 
to make. As a political entity, the EU is neither a state nor a traditional forum for co-
operation between states, but is rather a merging of nation states, equipped with both 
supranational and intranational institutions and forms of co-operation (ibid:27). The 
exceptional sui generis character of the political framework may in itself add to the 
confusion and the alienation felt by European citizens, which in turn fuels the sense 
of fatigue.  
Post-war Europe experienced some major political changes regarding international 
relations, and the establishment of the EU was central in this. Claims were made that 
the sovereignty of the nation-state had been eroded to such an extent that the 
Westphalian state system was being transcended by the emergence of a ‘neo-
medieval’ system; an arrangement consisting of overlapping and multiple forms of 
authority and identity, standing in stark contrast to the distinctive structures of 
sovereign nation-states (Hyde-Price 1999:114). This left concerns over the way in 
which the EU would be able to operate in such a Europe ‘growing together’, or at 
least without a prominent east-west division. Following this development up to today, 
the task for the EU now is how to deal with enlargement in the best possible way 
without losing the advantages of the existing forms of institutionalised co-operation, 
and without undermining the dynamism and integrity of the integrating process (ibid: 
115), which is illustrated in debates of widening versus deepening prominent in EU 
integration discourse. Consequently, there have been claims that enlargement 
inevitably will lead to some form of “differentiated integration”, integration at 
“multiple speeds”, and in “concentric circles” (ibid: 116). One can see European 
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integration up until now as having developed within a structure of a wealthy core 
territory, and additional concentric circles evolving around this centre. This pattern is 
said to have been driven by the dialectics of integration and expansion (Vobruba 
2003:35). 
The European Union has from the very beginning held an optimistic view of the 
future European political community. The idea of a more integrated and expanded 
entity has since the start been the prominent ideal. Indeed, the EU always strove for 
the goal of an ‘ever closer union’3. Now, this goal seems to have become questioned 
more strongly than ever. Governments, politicians and academics alike struggle to see 
where this ever changing and expanding process will end, and subsequently what this 
will mean for the Union. There is an image forming that those one is to bond 
politically with are more different socially and culturally than in the past, and 
consequently an EU together in solidarity does seem harder to achieve or even to 
accept. All in all, the project of an ever closer Union is perceived to have come to a 
standstill, and there are widespread doubts about the future direction of the EU. 
Enlargement thus brings with it a number of fundamental questions. 
The EU has historically dealt well with the accession of new members. Its history as 
such has always been one of permanent expansion (Durand & Missiroli 2006:1). This 
began with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, 
when the original six countries in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
became nine. By the mid nineties, the Union had grown to comprise 15 member 
states. The end of the Cold War provided Europe with a historic opportunity for those 
who dreamed of a united Europe. Ever since the post World War One era, and 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s movement for European unity and his vision of a pan-Europa 
(Stirk 1996), there had been continuous discussions over bringing Europe closer 
together. Until the end of the Cold War, this proved to be an elusive goal. At the 
Copenhagen summit of June 1993, the EU opened the door to membership for post-
                                              
3 From the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 1957 signed in Rome. 
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Communist countries by accepting eastern enlargement in principle, and Europe’s 
east-west division started to crumble. The 2004 enlargement was said to have finally 
healed the rift opened up by the east-west division and the Cold War, welcoming ten 
new states with very different political experiences. This proved the most extensive 
enlargement of the EU’s history yet (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2005:2), both in terms of 
numbers and heterogeneity. The entry of Bulgaria and Romania in January 20074 
adds another two countries to the Union. According to the Commission, the accession 
of these two states is viewed an “integral part” of the 2004 enlargement5. Croatia and 
Turkey, the next potential candidates, have both started their negotiations. However, 
in the words of the president of the Commission Josè Barroso; there is now a need for 
an “institutional overhaul” in the aftermath of the accessions of Bulgaria and 
Romania, and there have been subsequent calls for a freeze on enlargement 
(Aftenposten 2006b). The succession of enlargements, and the resulting character of 
the EU as a political system in constant change, continues to be a matter of frequent 
discussion (Karlsson 2001:130). 
Enlargement is thus seen as a historic opportunity, as well as a moral and political 
obligation, for the creation of a united and peaceful, democratic Europe (Rehn 2005a, 
2005b, Enlargement Newsletter 2006). Enlargement is further expected to contribute 
to improved security, increased economic opportunity and enhanced political and 
diplomatic weight for Europe on the global political stage (Baun 2000:228, Rehn 
2005a, 2005b). From this, one can derive that enlargement is a contributing factor in 
making the EU a more competitive and dynamic institution, and to a larger degree 
making it better prepared to meet the challenges of a globalised and constantly 
changing world5.  
                                              
4 The Accession Treaties were signed on 25 April 2005; both countries entered the EU 1 January 2007. 
5 Enlargement Newsletter 20 June 2006. 
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Enlargement of the EU has led to a discussion on Europe’s borders and whether, and 
if so how, our perception of Europe is changing. Frontiers are not set in stone, and the 
territorial nation-state Westphalian understanding of borders we have become 
accustomed to may be challenged. What has traditionally been seen as more western 
European values are now increasingly transferred eastwards in addition to the earlier 
southern enlargements? What are, if any, the geographic limits to enlargement? How 
will the future borders of Europe be defined? How can the Union ensure that 
enlargement will not lead to new divisions and conflicts within Europe? What will an 
enlarged EU look like, in terms of institutional architecture and internal political 
dynamics? These are all questions that have taken on great significance following the 
debate over absorption capacity and enlargement fatigue; “the feelings of anxiety and 
lack of energy that have suddenly checked the seemingly inexorable growth of the 
European Union” (Sunday Herald 2005).   
There are other indicators of problems within the EU system; the Maastricht Treaty 
was for instance poorly received by public opinion, and the European Monetary 
System nearly collapsed under pressures from financial markets in 1992 and 1993. 
Economic recession further increased an already high unemployment rate, making 
Europe’s failure to deal with its economic and social problems evident (Monitoring 
European Integration 6 1995). This accumulated into the belief that Europe was at a 
crossroads and questions developed concerning whether European institutions were 
still adequate in dealing with the pressing new challenges.  
Lastly, there is the problem of uncertainty; the fact that European integration has 
never reached a definite form or content, neither for its institutions, procedures and 
competencies, nor for its members. Its characteristic mark was that it always 
resembled a ‘process’ towards an unknown destination (Deubner 1999:118).  
The problems posed by enlargement may not be the easiest to solve, but the political 
will of the EU remains clear. The legal basis of enlargement is in the Article 49 of the 
Treaty on European Union (1992), which states that “any European State which 
respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the 
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Union”. This treaty provision however, does not mean all European countries must 
apply, or that the EU must accept all applications (European Commission 2006c, 
Rehn 2006). 
The previous enlargements were facilitated by more tailor-made solutions, whereas 
the countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements are considered more difficult to 
adopt in present circumstances. The political landscape of Europe is now considered 
more complex than before. Enlarging to the east inevitably leads to a reduction in the 
previous level of cohesion. In this sense, the perceived crisis seems to be an 
inescapable consequence of enlargement.  
1.4 Operationalisations of terms 
The term absorption capacity will be used as explained in chapter 1.2, and further a 
theoretic clarification of the term will be discussed in chapter 4. The Penguin 
dictionary defines to absorb as “to make part of an existing whole; to incorporate, to 
engage or occupy wholly”. Capacity is defined as “the maximum amount that can be 
contained or produced, ability or talent, power or potential” (Penguin Books 2002). I 
will argue that, as important in all political systems, legitimacy and effectiveness are 
pivotal in the study of the EU. Legitimacy will regards absorption capacity be 
operationalised according to measures found in the Eurobarometer surveys. Firstly, 
the focus will be on whether the respondents consider the EU to be a “good thing”; 
the general support for membership of the EU. Secondly, the life satisfaction of the 
European citizens is taken into account, further the perceived benefits from EU 
membership and lastly, support for further enlargement. Effectiveness will be 
operationalised by the Internal Market Scoreboard, measuring the degree and speed 
with which member states transpose Internal Market directives into national law.  
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1.5 Methodological Considerations 
1.5.1 Absorption capacity as a qualitative case study 
This thesis is mainly an explorative study, in that it seeks to investigate how concerns 
over legitimacy and effectiveness specifically, and the enlargement fatigue more 
generally, have shaped the current mood of the EU, leading to the introduction of the 
concept of absorption capacity. The discussion will in general terms be based on 
identifying the concept of absorption capacity and analysing its possible implications, 
its re-emergence and limitations. In methodological terms, this is considered best 
achieved using a descriptive methodological approach.   
In terms of methodological structure, the argument of this thesis is divided into three 
parts. Firstly, a historic focus is presented, arguing that the concerns relating to 
absorption capacity were not evident in the EU prior to 2003 and the prospect of 
eastern enlargement. Secondly, the debate following the enlargement of 2004 is 
discussed, alongside the definitions and clarifications that followed the term’s re-
emergence. Thirdly, I evaluate the actual situation of absorption capacity in the EU 
by assessing survey data. In this section, different conceptualisations of legitimacy 
and effectiveness are discussed and followed by an assessment of crude measures 
found in the Eurobarometer surveys and the Internal Market Scoreboard respectively. 
The research strategy used is of an intensive character, as the focus is on identifying 
several variables in one or few entities (Hellevik 2002:97-98). Intensive research 
studies provide detailed knowledge on the chosen subject, placing it within a real life 
context and thus increasing the potential for a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject (ibid: 98). As the purpose is to investigate one phenomenon within the EU 
context and possible variables related to this, assuming that effectiveness and 
legitimacy play an important role; an intensive research strategy is considered the 
most appropriate approach to analysing absorption capacity. 
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The case study as a research strategy is defined as “an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 
2003:13). As such, the case study is preferable when examining contemporary events 
when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated. In accordance with Yin (ibid: 
13), this method will be used, enabling the coverage of contextual conditions; given 
that they are pertinent to the phenomenon under study. EU politics can be said to be 
characterised by its contextual conditions, and as the EU is a unique political 
construction, it is difficult to compare it with other organisations or states. Therefore, 
given that the purpose is to gain a better understanding of an isolated and complex 
instance, a qualitative case study approach is considered the most appropriate method 
of analysis.  
A distinctive feature of qualitative as opposed to quantative research, is that the data 
used will constitute of pre-existing literature and not numbers (Thagaard 2003:13). 
Here, material of primary and secondary sources are used; articles, books, speeches, 
and reports. The aim of the qualitative case study is neither to provide statistical 
representative data, nor to generalise findings to some larger population to which the 
specific case belongs. It is rather to be able to discover the essence in a complex 
relation, without claiming validity for other cases. The case study thus provides an 
opportunity to focus on one particular phenomenon. Although there are claims that 
case studies are unscientific in that they do not hold statistical representability 
(Andersen 2003:14), these disadvantages do not take away from the potential 
advantages of a detailed insight into specific phenomena in their social context. Yet, 
as opposed to quantitative case studies, one cannot hold a statistical significant to be 
representative for phenomena outside the one we are studying. In this sense, there is a 
problem of generalisation in qualitative studies. The debate of whether the EU 
constitutes an n of 1, and subsequently as a consequence inductive generalisations 
from such studies cannot lead to ”generally applicable knowledge”, is as old as the 
study of the EU (Jachtenfuchs 2005:279). Still, being able to make generalisations is 
not viewed a necessary goal, as I have no wishes to do so given the particular concept 
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studied. In this sense, I recognise the uniqueness of the EU in comparison to other 
organisations and states, and therefore consider it not purposeful to look for grounds 
on which to make generalisations given the distinct entity that is under study. As 
such, case study approaches will be the only viable option as the phenomenon under 
study is unique (Andersen 2003:61), and in the respect that the phenomenon of 
absorption capacity is unprecedented. 
Case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence (Yin 
2003:14-15). Similarly this thesis uses mainly qualitative sources, yet a quantitative 
approach is additionally used in the form of data from Eurobarometer and the Internal 
Market Scoreboard, which are employed as a basis for the empirical discussion. Yet 
overall, the strategy taken is distinctly a qualitative approach. 
1.5.2 Empirical Sources 
The fundamental principle regarding sources is that all sources available on the 
subject should be taken into one’s scientific work, in order to be able to claim a 
methodological completeness (Dahl 2002:50). However, as Dahl admits, this tends to 
be highly unrealistic and practically impossible in actual source gathering. As is 
suggested, I have chosen a sample of evidence, which is regarded as an adequate, 
comprehensive and representative selection. Sources that are used are of a cognitive 
character (ibid: 40), directed at past instances of enlargement. 
The primary evidence used in this discussion consists of written documents6. The 
documents used have come in different forms, ie written reports, published articles, 
public administrative EU documents, formal studies of the same subject of study, as 
well as newspaper articles. I have been aware of potential bias, particularly in 
                                              
6 Yin (2003:83) lists documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical 
artefacts as the most important sources used for/in case studies. The latter five have not been deemed fitting in this 
discussion, and so the primary evidence has been found in different sources of documents. 
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newspaper articles, yet the usefulness of such sources are considered to outweigh the 
potential bias, which in turn has been accounted for. It is important to note that 
overall, documents were produced for a specific purpose, as well as for a particular 
audience, which need be appreciated in terms of accuracy and usefulness of the 
interpretations (Yin 2003). Of specific importance to the analysis are the crude 
measures used from various Eurobarometer surveys regarding the legitimacy of the 
EU. The Internal Market Scoreboard has been used in order to examine the 
effectiveness of the EU. These represent elements of a more quantitative character in 
an otherwise qualitative survey, enabling one to get a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon that is absorption capacity.  
There exist three principles or possible methods of data collection, all of which can 
strengthen the reliability and construct validity of a case study. The first one of these 
is the usage of multiple sources of evidence. This principle of data collection is based 
upon the theory of triangulation as a rationale for using multiple sources of evidence. 
In this study, I have drawn upon three or more sources, each converging on the same 
set of findings. Secondly, one could create a case study database, and thirdly create a 
chain of evidence. This has not been attempted here (ibid: 83, 97).   
1.5.3 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability is a measure of how accurately data has been handled, whilst validity is a 
measure of the relevance of the data used for the particular question under discussion 
(Hellevik 2002:183).  
The discussion in this study is to a major extent based on written sources; and as such 
the reliability will relate to my interpretation and presentation of the text. The content 
of the various sources have to a large degree coincided with each other. The sources 
used have been available in Norwegian and/or English, which has reduced the need 
for any concerns over language related errors. All of the above contributes to the 
belief that reliability is satisfactorily accounted for in this study. The sources 
available on this subject appear to be limited, which makes it plausible to believe that 
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the sources used are collectively adequate as a basis for the discussion. As such, the 
validity of the sources seems to be of a satisfactory level. 
The credibility of a study follows from an evaluation of the quality of the data 
considered (Thagaard 2003:178). Credibility also springs from the fact that the 
research has been performed in a method that is recognised and that one can have 
confidence in. As a consequence of the principle of subjectivity in qualitative 
research, credibility cannot be ascertained (ibid). I will argue that the data used from 
Eurobarometer should be accepted as credible, as it is commissioned by the EU and 
carried out by recognised survey companies. This also applies to the Internal Market 
Scoreboard. 
The development of a case study design needs to maximise four conditions related to 
design quality (Yin 2003:19). The extent, to which my study can be considered valid, 
can be measured against the first, the second and the fourth criteria as presented by 
Yin. Firstly, construct validity is of importance, particularly in my discussion here. In 
this sense, I have had to establish correct operational measures for the concepts under 
study, particularly absorption capacity. Secondly, and of less importance here as this 
is a descriptive case study and not a casual or explanatory study, is internal validity. 
Internal validity focuses on establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships. Thirdly, external validity points to establishing the domain to which a 
study’s findings can be generalised. This deals with the problem of knowing whether 
a study’s findings are generalisable beyond the scope of the immediate case study 
(ibid: 37). Survey research relies on statistical generalisation, whereas case studies 
rely on analytical generalisation to some broader theory (ibid). The last criterion is 
reliability, that is, demonstrating that the operation of a study can be repeated, with 
the same results, if done at a later point in time (ibid: 33-34).  
The purpose of qualitative research, as is the objective here, is to understand the 
context within which a social phenomenon takes place, in order to create 
understanding of what is being studied (Thagaard 2003:193). 
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2. Lessons from the Past: Enlarging the Union in 
the Absence of concerns relating to Absorption 
Capacity 
Enlargement has been at the heart of the EU’s development over several decades 
(European Commission 2006a). In this chapter, by looking at the enlargements from 
1972 to 1995, I will argue that these early enlargements did not cause such 
considerable apprehension as was the result of the later enlargements, and as such, 
discussions of absorption capacity were never had. This is not to say however, that 
there were no concerns over the consequences these enlargements would bring. The 
expansion southwards particularly prompted fears over the admission of the newly 
democratised, relatively poorer Mediterranean countries. Yet, absorption capacity 
was never defined, nor did it become a part of official EU discourse in the way in 
which the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have prompted. 
There are three main considerations which the EU needs to take into account when 
dealing with enlargement. Firstly, the European citizens need be considered for 
legitimacy reasons. Secondly, the community’s set of rules must be accounted for, as 
each new member state must accept these to be allowed into the EU. Lastly, 
enlargements’ financial consequences need be taken into account. Overall, the 
enlargements up until the one of 1995 did not generate such strong feelings in the 
public, one did not expect the new member states to challenge the acquis to a 
dramatic degree, and the perceived financial costs were not too great. Yet, these 
enlargements did elicit certain concerns.  
Enlargement was seen as a natural part of the development of the Community. The 
overall benefits of geographical expansion were stressed, such as the strengthening of 
the EU’s position as a soft power. Enlargement has included the consolidation of 
democracy, the establishing of human rights and the introduction of stability across 
the continent. European integration was as such initiated for political rather than 
economic reasons. Particularly the ‘German question’ was important for Europe in 
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the post war era, with France seeking more permanent control over the German 
potential, and the Community offering Germany an opportunity to escape the fate of 
an outcast nation (Scharpf 1999:44). Along the way, strong economic incentives 
added to the European project. The community has become a stronger international 
player, increasing the weight of Europe globally. The economic benefits from 
enlargement include increased prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the member 
states to better deal with the challenges posed by globalisation. Nevertheless, the 
enlargement process remained questioned amongst member states and citizens alike. 
The enlargements have added increasingly different historical experiences, economic 
structures, and political priorities to the EU, and with this they have “led to a search 
for new unity in diversity and greater deepening of integration” (Kaiser and Elvert 
2004:2). Once inside the Union, the newer member states are exposed to various 
internal pressures of common policy making, as well as inclusion in transnational 
networks. This opens the path for cross-country socialisation, which in turn adds to 
their progressive ‘Europeanisation’ (ibid: 3). Accession and membership of the EU 
have initiated a degree of political socialisation into the original and long term 
objectives of the EU and its founding members, in turn clarifying competing visions 
of European integration. Up until the third wave of enlargement of 1995, the 
European integration dynamics led to a ‘deepening’ of the EU despite its vast 
heterogeneity, allowing the necessary adjustments inside the EU in preparation for 
each enlargement (Elvert 2004:205-206). Some countries have even experienced 
inclusion to what one considers the ’core Europe’ within the enlarged Union, as 
Finland illustrates after its acceptance of the Euro. EU enlargement has far reaching 
implications not only upon the political shape of Europe, but also for the institutional 
set-up and major policies of the Union. This is reflected in the cumbersome 
discussions over the budget, the agricultural and regional policies as well as the 
representation of members in the different institutions (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005:3).  
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In the summer of 1952, France, West-Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), on the 
grounds that this would contribute to increased economic growth, a rise in 
employment rates and higher standards of living more generally (Førland & Claes 
2002:29). The forces behind this integrational project were fivefold; economic 
factors, geopolitics, federalism in principle as well as American pressure for a federal 
western Europe, and the defeat of the extreme nationalism of the second world war, 
all contributed to the idea of closer co-operation between European states (ibid:15). 
With the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the ECSC reformed into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and Euratom; the customs union now sought to cover all sectors 
combined with co-operation over nuclear energy (ibid:45). In 1973, the community 
expanded for the first time, when the original six member states became nine with the 
accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. Five enlargements later, and the EU of 
today comprises 27 members.  
The nine new member states which entered the community before the 2004 
enlargement had in advance of their accessions all participated in various forms of 
institutionalised western and European co-operation outside of an EU context. At 
different points in time, they became members of what came to be known as the 
OECD in 1961-62. Greece became associated with the EEC in 1961; Spain 
negotiated trade arrangements with it. Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, and the 
UK, together with Norway and Switzerland, created the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in 1960-61. The founding states of EFTA, with the exception of 
Portugal, did in fact fulfil the EEC/EC’s general conditions for membership, whereas 
Spain, Portugal and Greece did not (Elvert 2004:197). These forms of co-operation 
prior to accession may have contributed to these countries’ uncomplicated integration 
into the European community. Apart from certain singular events, these early waves 
of enlargement did not cause controversy comparable to that following the later 
enlargement of 2004, and concerns were not raised over the institutions of the EU and 
their capacity to integrate its new members.  
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2.1 First Enlargement of 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom 
The EEC expanded for the first time since its foundation in 1957, when Denmark, the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the original six member states. 
The first enlargement stirred similar emotions in the original member states as those 
we have seen following the eastern enlargement of 2004. The six founding members 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC)7 feared that the expansion to Denmark, Ireland and the UK would 
undermine the finalité politique of the EC and similarly prevent the deepening of the 
Community (Kaiser & Elvert 2004:2). Other more specific fears included the 
relegation of the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament and EC politics as 
such, as they did not have any like-minded parties in Denmark nor in the UK (ibid:2). 
The British decision to apply for EEC membership in 1961 was a result of a complex 
mixture of economic and political objectives. Their second application in 1967 was 
motivated by the failure of the British government’s economic policies. De Gaulle 
predictably vetoed the British application for the second time in 1967, and it was then 
left on the table to be taken up after the European Council of the Hague in 1969. This 
eventually led to British accession to the EC under terms negotiated by the 
Conservatives under Edward Heath. The UK had no Christian Democratic party, and 
the Conservatives were excluded from the cohesive policy community of continental 
European Christian Democrats, a party family which had been an important driving 
force behind ‘core Europe’ integration after 1945 (Kaiser 2004:20). 
After de Gaulle’s veto, the British government set up the EFTA of the so-called 
‘outer Seven’; together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and 
Switzerland (ibid:13). EFTA was as such viewed as a stepping stone to facilitate later 
contact with the EC regards membership. The Association was regarded a temporary 
                                              
7 France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg founded the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951-52, which reformed into the European Economic Community in 1957.  In 1967, the abbreviation EC 
was introduced. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reforms the community into the EU. 
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arrangement and a tool for improving the UK’s bilateral relationship with the EC 
(ibid: 21). 
British anti-German sentiments may have been of some importance in leading to the 
scepticism found in the community toward British accession. This is illustrated by 
Macmillan’s fear that the EC would be dominated either by a ‘Fourth Reich’ after 
Adenauer or by de Gaulle whom he alternately compared with Napoleon and Hitler 
(ibid). The British attitude to ‘core Europe’ was generally marked with prejudice, in 
that the EEC “had been invented and was still run by Catholic, culturally backward 
Conservatives” (ibid). British Conservatives and Socialists had very little 
understanding of political Catholicism and Christian Democracy, which they 
considered “backward cultural values” (ibid).  
Ireland saw EC membership as a way to ‘free’ itself from the UK. For Ireland, 
agriculture was the most important sector where membership of the EC would prove 
beneficial. The CAP constituted a ‘goldmine’ for Ireland, providing a very favourable 
context for productivity increases and a greater orientation towards exports (Moxon-
Browne 2004:58). European integration for a newcomer was perceived as a way of 
protecting nationhood while maximising the opportunities offered by a more 
globalised world (ibid:66). Ireland derived from its membership of the EU not so 
much a feeling that its nation state had been ‘rescued’ a la Milward, except perhaps 
from its ex-colonial dependency on Britain, but more as a release of innate 
possibilities in social, political and economic terms. 
In Denmark, the support for membership also depended on anticipated agrarian 
benefits, rather than general economic gains from participation (Elvert 2004:199). 
Denmark was however geographically closer to the original members of the EC, than 
Ireland was. “The British move [toward the EC] promised a unification of Denmark’s 
main trading partners and a solution to the old problem of securing export markets for 
agricultural  exports” (Laursen 2004:37). The negotiation process and the decision to 
join were highly politicised because future possible developments in the Community 
and in the institutional character became contested issues in the debate (ibid: 41).  
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The first enlargement of the EC brought out similar fears to the 2004 enlargement; 
expanding outside of what was seen as ‘core Europe’ brought concerns over how this 
would effect the deepening of the EU. The trade-off between enlargement and 
deepening has been a prevalent one ever since. The British applications were the 
most notable as they stand as the only ones to have been vetoed in the history of 
European enlargement. Danish and Irish accessions proved somewhat easier, but still 
courted highly politicised discussions. This wave of enlargement set a precedent, 
‘core Europe’ seemed undefined, and as such future accessions to the EC were to be 
expected. 
2.2 Second and third Enlargements of 1981 and 1986: 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal 
Greece joined the Community in 1981, with Spain and Portugal following suit in 
1986. There are several similarities in these enlargements, and for that reason they are 
looked upon collectively. The Mediterranean expansion took place under the 
continued impact of the systemic Cold War conflict, at a time when democratisation 
and a solid anchorage in the western world were important for the EC. This gave an 
additional impetus for the integration of the newly established Mediterranean 
democracies (Elvert 2004:202). Nevertheless, these enlargements did cause some 
concern in the Community. With the backdrop of the structural economic crisis of the 
1970s, and the internal dispute about the structure of the budget, concerns flourished 
about the effects of fiscal transfers to the economically under-developed and agrarian 
South, and the consequences this would have on the EC.  
The application for the second enlargement round which would allow Greece into the 
community, was submitted only two years after the entry of Denmark, Ireland, and 
the UK, at a time when the Community was already having difficulties dealing with 
the effects of the first enlargement (Sjursen 2006a:20). The prospect of another 
enlargement so shortly after the first provoked a “major outburst of angst” (ibid). 
There were doubts concerning whether the structure of the Commission and the 
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Council would survive the addition of yet more member governments, each with its 
own special national interest to protect and defend. In November 1975, the 
Economist stated that it was the “institutional implications of further enlargement 
which horrify officials in Brussels” (in Sjursen 2006a:20). This mirrors the debates 
raised in articles on the 2004 enlargements. 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain had previously been excluded from membership of the 
EC due to their political systems (Elvert 2004:197). In 1974, the military government 
led by Colonel Papadopoulos, Colonel Makarezos and Brigadier Pattakos, collapsed 
in Greece. In Portugal, the Salazar regime was overthrown. A year on, Franco’s 
regime in Spain came to an end. As these countries had been politically marginalized 
due to the authoritarian character of their political systems, EC membership seemed 
to offer great potential for their newly democratised structures. Being a part of a 
bigger democratic community with the external pressures for domestic economic, 
political, and societal modernisation following from this, provided vast opportunities 
for improvements in these countries (ibid).  
The Greek application was by no means an uncomplicated process; it was met with 
considerable scepticism (Ifantis 2004:80). Like Portugal and Spain, Greece too was 
considered a fragile democracy in Europe’s periphery. Security considerations were 
important in all three cases. This had even more significance regards Greece, due to 
the Greek-Turkish conflict, of which the Commission wanted to avoid being drawn 
into (ibid). The Greek admission was thus seen as a political decision, carrying a 
serious risk of embroiling the Community in the Greek-Turkish dispute. In contrast 
with the 1973 enlargement, when the transitional arrangements were seen as 
exclusively to the advantage of the candidate states, in the case of Greece, 
negotiations were aimed at “protecting the Community from the impact of the 
admission of a relatively under-developed country” (ibid:82). Athens repeatedly 
emphasised that Greece would not be seeking major economic support, and that its 
membership would not present the EC with any serious financial challenges, and that 
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in any case, its impact upon the balance of budgetary advantages within the EC 
would be rather small (ibid). 
Portugal’s pro-European outlook stemmed from decolonisation and the 
institutionalisation of democracy (Pinto & Teixeira 2004:127). Its approach to 
Europe was determined by a set of factors, the first being that the dictatorship had 
accepted the economic aspects of the intergovernmental co-operation, while rejecting 
the political facets, as well as any supranational or integrationist model. Additionally, 
Portugal depended upon the narrow scope of the regime’s foreign policy, the 
development of economic and social factors were therefore seen as paramount. 
Europe was thus considered a necessity, not a project (ibid). As a result of the 
military coup of 1974, Portugal was a fragile democracy in desperate need for 
economic as well as political support, which was offered to them from organisations 
like the EC. The first freely elected government opened for applying for EC 
membership, declaring this to be the strategic objective and political priority of 1976 
(Elvert 2004:201).  
There were several fundamental obstacles in the way of Portuguese accession. Firstly, 
there was the country’s low level of economic development, secondly, the 
authoritarian nature of the regime, and lastly the colonial problem (Pinto & Teixeira 
2004:118). The military coup in 1974 paved the way for institutionalisation of 
Portuguese democracy and decolonisation (ibid: 119). The Commission granted 
Portugal economic assistance and the negotiations were to last for seven years. 
However, the negotiation process was complex due to Portugal’s economic situation 
after its transition. The continuing governmental instability was also a cause for 
concern, so was the political and constitutional nature of the Portuguese regime. The 
country’s constitution was revised in 1982, which abolished the Council of the 
Revolution and the National Defence Law, and the armed forces accepted their 
subordination to civilian political authorities (ibid:122).  
As Portugal negotiated for EC membership, Spain conducted negotiations of their 
own, which proved another obstacle rather than the advantage one would have 
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expected. Spain, a larger country with a larger economy, did not share Portugal’s 
history of close relations with European economic institutions. Portugal hoped to 
achieve a quicker process by keeping its entry proposals separate from those of 
Spain. This proved not to be the best of strategies, as the EC policy was to negotiate 
with them simultaneously, leading to the two year delay of Portuguese accession, 
until all the “dossiers on Spain had been concluded” (ibid). In 1990, Portugal lost its 
status as an ‘under-developed country’, a label they had struggled with for years. 
Spain’s accession negotiations started in 1978, as did Portugal’s. The President of the 
European Council, which was in the hands of the UK at the beginning of 1977, 
stressed the importance of enlargement as an investment in Europe’s democratic 
future. Spain had long standing aspirations for European membership, “officially 
expressed since 1957 under the Franco regime”; but the prevailing political condition 
of Franco’s dictatorship did not represent an adequate basis for membership.  
The French were quick to express their scepticism regards the Spanish accession (de 
la Guardia 2004:102). A report published by the National Council of Young French 
Farmers in May 1976 carried the title “Spain: A Shock for Europe”. The integration 
of Spain into the EC was viewed as the most important political and economic 
disruption since the creation of the Common Market (ibid). The French Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac remarked that Spain’s entrance to the EC would be 
‘unbearable’ for French agriculture. The 1980s’ outburst of enthusiasm for Europe 
was connected with what was termed ‘the overcoming of periphery trauma’. In April 
1978, after applications for membership had been submitted by Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal, the European Commission presented the European Council with a report 
entitled “Reflections on  the Problems of Enlargement” (ibid:102). The Commission 
raised concerns that the three southern European applicants put such a burden of 
political responsibility upon the EC that they would not be able to avoid enlargement 
without renouncing the very principles on which it had been founded. The Parliament 
however, declared themselves strongly in favour of the integration of the three 
applicant states. Again, this enlargement round seemed to produce comparable 
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emotions and concerns in the existing member states, prompting discussions similar 
to those following the 2004 enlargement based around equivalent concerns. Yet, there 
was no mentioning of the capacity of the community to include these members. 
2.3 Fourth Enlargement of 1995: Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden 
This round of enlargement was less cumbersome than the previous round, which in 
part was due to the fact that the accessions of these countries were seen as a more 
natural addition to the established community. The fact that they were already 
members of the EFTA illustrates this. These states represented highly developed 
economies, and became net contributors to the budget. The concerns related to their 
accessions were therefore not economic in character, but rather related to political 
matters. Concerns included, for instance, that the addition of Austria could lead to the 
formation of a ‘Germanic bloc’, a ghost of the ‘German problem’ of the post war era. 
The neutrality status of both Austria and Sweden were therefore crucial, as was 
Finnish close relations with the Soviet Union. Whether these matters would 
undermine the strengthening of the EU’s vision for a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Kaiser and Elvert 2004:3), was a part of the problem concerning the 
accession of these states. Neutrality, however, lost parts of its appeal with the 
receding Cold War, although at the same time, it was argued that the shadow of it had 
continued to leave its mark on Austrian policies, like when the government could 
only agree on obtaining observer status in the Western European Union and 
participation in the NATO cooperation programme, Partnership for Peace (Gehler 
2004:143). In order to counteract the suspicion of still being ‘German’ or Anschluss 
orientated, Austria used ‘Europe’ as a means of identification, which in turn allowed 
for a more intensive link to Germany economically again (ibid:142). Finland, 
Sweden, and Austria had all preferred self exclusion beyond 1973 (Elvert 2004:197), 
until the collapse of the Soviet bloc paved the way for the accession of neutral and 
non-aligned countries like these (ibid: 202), completely transforming the European 
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security system. Like Sweden and Finland, Austria too was re-attracted to the EC as a 
result of the Single European Act initiative of 1986-87, and the danger of being 
excluded from a single European market (ibid:204). 
Austria is a highly industrialised state geographically in the centre of Europe, and 
thus perceived differently than the peripheral states of Finland and Sweden. With the 
bipolarity following the Second World War, it became important for Austria not to be 
drawn into the East-West conflict, and therefore ‘permanent’ neutrality became an 
important imperative (Gehler 2004: 132). Austria applied for EEC association in the 
latter part of 1961, at a time where the building of the Berlin Wall was still underway 
and the Cuban crisis was about to start. In 1972-73, Austria’s integration aims were 
partially fulfilled when Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland negotiated free trade 
treaties with the EC. In July 1972 these were signed, allowing Austria its partial 
economic participation whilst still keeping its neutrality (ibid: 137). The reformed 
international context with the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
had a major impact on Austrian integration policy (ibid: 140). “An intensified 
supranational integration policy followed after their entry into the EU, then with a 
conscious effective discarding of neutrality after 1995” (ibid: 138). Austria feared the 
threat of exclusion from an economically dynamic ‘core’ Europe, and EU 
membership was soon looked upon as a way of regaining sovereignty; a form of 
sharing ‘supranational sovereignty’. 
The Finnish case is an example of those states that decided to exclude themselves 
from the European integration process (Elvert 2004:197). Since the end of the Second 
World War and the FMCA Treaty with the Soviet Union, Finland had “subordinated 
its European relations to the former’s security policy interests”. Finland relied solely 
upon Nordic relations, although these resulted in problematic relations with the 
Soviets, not least due to the NATO membership status of Norway and Denmark. 
Finnish participation in the European integration process was seen as incompatible 
with Finnish security politics in relation to the Soviet Union. In this respect, Finnish 
self-exclusion was related to foreign policy, not rooted in euro scepticism (ibid). 
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With Finland, there had been a sense of distance from the EU, a fear of not being 
securely ‘in Europe’, and of being associated with the ‘wrong’ countries (Ojanen 
2004:164). A peculiarity with the Finnish system was that integration policy was seen 
as part of the foreign policy, which in turn had been subordinated to security policy 
(ibid:150). The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 placed some restrictions on the Finnish 
military, as the country had partly sided with Germany in the war. The Treaty on 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) concluded with the Soviet 
Union in 1948, was pivotal in setting the tone for Finland’s policies (ibid). Finland 
strove to keep out of Great Power confrontations and swore to neutrality. This proved 
problematic too, and required national decision making capacity, encompassing 
economic policy, and made it difficult to combine with membership of the EC. 
Finland became the textbook case of the adaptation typical of a small state, especially 
when in geographical proximity to a much larger and ideologically different state; 
‘finlandisation’ (ibid: 151). Finnish membership negotiations started in March 1993, 
and were concluded one year later. Sweden and Austria’s willingness to enter the EU 
despite their policy of neutrality encouraged Finland (ibid: 160), who entered the 
Union in 1995. With both Finland and Sweden joining the EU, suspicions arose that 
the Nordics would form a bloc that would align with Germany (ibid: 158).  
Sweden held a party consensus over non-alignment in peace time and neutrality as a 
goal in times of war (Gussarsson 2004:170). Non-alignment was believed to 
contribute to world peace and therefore remained the main motive behind a Swedish 
security doctrine, which gave the country a ‘third-way identity’ as international 
mediator and arbitrator. The Swedish economy was comparatively better after World 
War Two than that of most of Europe, with their infrastructure and industry intact. 
The Swedish economy was however highly dependent on exports of industrial goods.  
The poor state of Sweden’s economy was also crucial to its membership. The 
economic situation of the early 1990s was of specific importance, the concurrent 
American recession had weakened one of the most important markets for the Swedish 
export industry. This turned into a severe economic crisis. Swedish membership can 
thus be seen as a question of economic character. Discussions between Sweden and 
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the EC/EU went rather straightforwardly on the whole, partly because many 
questions had already been solved during the EEA negotiations. The only major 
difference arose as the Swedish government asked to be given the right to opt out of 
the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union, which was not granted. 
Membership had to be sanctioned by the Swedish citizens in a referendum (ibid: 
181). Sweden, the ‘reluctant European’, joined the Union on 1 January 1995.  
The fourth round of enlargement was a much smoother process, marked by the 
accession of three countries which had traditionally been seen as more acceptable 
than those within the previous round. The accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
presented numerous challenges to the concept of the EU as providing foreign and 
security leadership. Issues of neutrality aside, this was a relatively peaceful accession, 
devoid of any general sense of enlargement fatigue.    
2.4 The absence of concerns relating to Absorption 
Capacity 
Within these early waves of enlargement, absorption capacity did not become as 
prominent or defined in negotiations. There were naturally considerable problems 
raised in these waves of enlargements, most notably the cases of the United Kingdom 
and the southern Mediterranean countries. However, in contrast to the enlargements 
of 2004 and 2007, these problems were not seen an insurmountable ones. They did 
not, for example, revolve around crucial issues such as European identity, or 
questioning of Europe’s frontiers. Clearly, similar concerns surround the recent 
accessions to the EU as they did in the early enlargements discussed above, markedly 
issues of economic capacity was prominent in negotiations. Yet, these concerns were 
not pivotal, as behind them lay the general consensus that there should be a concerted 
effort toward the ‘ever closer union’. In this respect, absorption capacity was never 
discussed nor defined; given the general agreement that enlargement and the identity 
of those enlarging would provide a stronger European community. 
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3. Contemporary Enlargements and the emergence 
of Absorption Capacity as a concept 
It was argued in the last chapter that the enlargements up until the mid 1990s went 
remarkably well, and did not generate major controversies in the Union. Citizens 
voiced certain concerns and some apprehension was found regards the enlargements 
to the poorer and newly democratised south, yet the community did not experience 
the destructive disquiet which was to be seen later. However, this was soon to 
change. The theoretical opportunity provided for eastern enlargement by the 
Copenhagen Criteria set off feelings in the European public, academia and media not 
seen before. Eastern enlargement quickly became associated with the ‘absorption 
capacity’ of the Union. Reservations escalated over future enlargements as 
discussions of the dreaded political and economic consequences of the eastern 
expansion coloured the European mood. Enlargement was no longer seen as the 
positive and necessary commitment needed for an ever closer union, as had been 
celebrated in previous enlargements. 
Enlargement has been at the heart of the EU’s development over several decades 
(European Commission 2006a). Being referred to as the “historic triumph” of the EU 
(Ash 2007a), indeed the political essence of European integration has been to 
overcome the division of Europe and to contribute to the peaceful unification of the 
continent (European Commission 2006a). Still, enlargement means change, and 
change carries the possibility of disruption, and the EU as such now seems plagued 
with self doubt. This can partly be seen as a consequence of its success. The changes 
represented by enlargement are expected to bring long term benefits and increase the 
prosperity of Europe, but the short term perceived costs; like the fear of immigrants 
taking local jobs and burdening local services, still cause major concern. The long 
term benefits have undoubtedly placed the EU in a strong negotiation position 
regards international affairs. Yet, at the beginning of the new millennium, the 
disadvantages, or what have been seen to be disadvantages, overshadowed the 
benefits of enlargement. Former president of the European Commission, Jacques 
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Delors8, stressed the magnitude of this negative atmosphere, arguing that it was the 
worst in the history of the EU; worse than the period of de Gaulle’s “empty chair” in 
1965, and worse than Thatcher’s persistent demands for “our own money back” in 
the early 1980s (Economist 2007c).   
Absorption capacity soon became the buzz word symbolising the atmosphere. With 
the upcoming enlargement of 2004, one looked to the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, 
which states that “the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining 
the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries” (European Council 
1993).  However, the Union, it was now claimed, needed to possess the institutional, 
financial and political capacity in order to open its doors to new members.  
The tensions which resulted in the absorption capacity resurgence stemmed from the 
perceived crisis of the decision making capabilities of the Union, questioning whether 
Europe was still capable of making operational decisions. The increasingly tough 
international economic competition Europe was facing added to the problem. Further, 
Europe was experiencing an identity crisis in which citizens increasingly questioned 
the purpose of European integration. The uncertainty about the Union’s geographical 
contours added to the concerns as no practical entity can be built on a movement of 
rapid and continuous expansion whose limits are uncertain. At a time when the 
Union’s own companies and employees were facing serious difficulties, the arrival of 
new members was perceived as too great a financial burden. A gap therefore 
developed between the Union’s goal and its actual capabilities and readiness for this. 
This, in turn, led to the launch of absorption capacity as a concept within EU 
discourse. 
                                              
8 President of the European Commission 1985-1995.  
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3.1 Fifth Enlargement 2004: Central and Eastern European 
Expansion 
Following the decision made at the European Council at Copenhagen in December 
2002, ten states from central and eastern Europe were welcomed into the European 
Union in 20049; the largest enlargement yet in the history of the EU. Economic 
interests, historical experiences, and the political priorities of the new member states 
differed substantially from the Union of 15 members (Kaiser & Elvert 2004:1). This 
introduced concerns over the EU’s ability to handle the increased heterogeneity 
which this integration round represented. Accession of these states brought with it 
many advantages, including increased export opportunities, access to skilled workers, 
and a chance to enhance the EU’s security on the future border with the successor 
states of the former Soviet Union (ibid). However, the amount of concern this 
enlargement generated was not comparable to that of previous enlargements. In 
addition to the anxieties which the increased heterogeneity of the Union caused, 
further concerns related to the institutional balance between larger and smaller 
member states, particularly as the enlargement introduced only one “larger” country; 
Poland. This, it was feared, would have a negative impact upon political decision 
making and stability within the EU. Despite all the negativity however, the ten 
member states have, in the words of the Commission, reached an “excellent” level of 
compliance with EU law, making significant contributions to the work of EU 
institutions, as well as having generated increased levels of economic activity and 
produced high rates of economic growth (European Commission 2006a). The 
institutions of the EU have carried on working normally, despite the predictions of 
gridlock. In retrospect, the 2004 enlargement went remarkably well, both from the 
member states’ perspective as well as the Union’s, particularly when measured 
against the fears that preceded it (Economist 2005).  
                                              
9 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the 
European Union on 1 May 2004.  
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For eight of the ten accession countries; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the step into the European 
community marked the broader process of political, economic, and social 
transformation that had started with the collapse of communism and the transition to 
capitalist democracy in the years of 1989-91. The realigning of these countries’ 
foreign policies into western European structures, the “returning to Europe”, had been 
key ideas in their communist revolutions (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2005:1). Therefore, 
there was a considerable degree of elite as well as popular support in favour of EU 
membership in these countries (ibid); accession was presented as a fundamental need 
following from historic, geographical, as well as psychological grounds. 
The accession processes started with the conclusion of the Europe Agreements of 
1991-1992, which consisted of bilateral treaties designed to create a series of 
dialogues between the acceding states and the EU. Following the Copenhagen 
Summit in 1993, it was declared that all Europe Agreement states were eligible for 
membership once they fulfilled the certain political, economic, and legal criteria. 
These criteria presupposed a working democratic structure, a functioning market 
economy, observing human and minority rights as well as accepting the community’s 
aquis. At the Madrid summit in 1995, an additional criterion was included; all 
accession countries should hold the administrative capacity needed to meet the 
obligations set in the Copenhagen criteria. Subsequently, the former communist states 
applied for membership between 1994 and 1996 (ibid: 2). Negotiations for five of the 
countries were formally opened following the 1997 Luxembourg summit; including 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, together with Cyprus. 
Slovakia was excluded from the negotiations for failing to meet the political criteria. 
At the Helsinki summit of December 1999, it was decided that Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Malta would start their negotiations in 2000. At 
the Laeken 2001 summit, the admission of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia together with Cyprus and Malta, was 
agreed in principle (ibid). The accession treaties were signed in April 2003, and the 
ten states entered the EU on the first of May 2004. 
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Cultural proximity was frequently emphasised when discussing relations between 
EU15 and the CEECs (Lundgren 2006:135). There was a focus on the features which 
united the EU15 and the CEECs; which consisted of a common history, a common 
culture, and a set of common values, sharing the same past and roots. There was also 
a perceived sense of duty on behalf of the EU given the commonalities shared. 
Despite this, there were still fears over the potential problems accession of these 
countries would bring to the EU. The CEECs were overall poorer and more reliant on 
agriculture, and thus concerns were raised over the inevitable burdening of the 
structural and agricultural funds. This, it was argued, would lead to a situation where 
the existing members would have to increase their contributions to the budget. 
Adding to these financial concerns was the fact that the enlargement included the 
accession of ten relatively poorer states, not just one or two. This would thus mean 
ten new states around the table in negotiations, with their own particular national 
preferences. Additionally, this presented problems in terms of language barriers, and 
the number of translations needed would be time consuming, slowing down the 
decision making process and making coming to decisions harder. On a more positive 
note, enlargement was expected to lead to an extended market which in turn would 
lead to increased trade and economic growth (ibid: 128). Interestingly, the decision to 
enlarge did however reflect that despite all this, the potential benefits related to 
enlargement were expected to outweigh the costs (European Commission 2006a).  
Geopolitical considerations additionally contributed to the inclusion of the ten 
member states, particularly as European strategic priorities changed after the break-
up of the former Yugoslavia. The danger to stability was now greater than what was 
previously perceived. Pressure from the accession states themselves also played an 
important role in the shifting mood in supporting their accessions (Skålnes 
2005:220). Another factor which persuaded the EU that eastern commitment could no 
longer be postponed, was the rise of protectionist pressures in the eastern countries 
(ibid:221). The main threat after the fall of communism was that the changes brought 
about by the political and economic transitions taking place would lead to political 
instability and the abandonment of reform, as well as to nationalist conflicts along the 
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borders of the Community. There were concerns that this instability would have 
spillover effects that could potentially pose a security threat to Western Europe (ibid: 
213-214). Geographical proximity reinforced this concern. Lastly, the Copenhagen 
summit convinced sceptical member states that the move towards eastern 
enlargement entailed no precise steps for inclusion in the near future. From an 
accession viewpoint, EU membership was seen as a motivating factor for 
democratisation.  
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005:204) argue that economic and geopolitical 
interests alone could not fully account for the EU’s decision to embark on such an 
“ambitious and costly enlargement”. Confronted by the power of norm based 
arguments, the West talked itself into a commitment to admit countries that shared its 
liberal values, and in turn, this ‘rhetorical entrapment’ as they call it, has 
subsequently sustained enlargement despite the fact that a mere association for 
eastern Europe would have better served the EU’s interests (Moravcsik and 
Vachudova 2005:204). As such, idealism played a part in the decision to enlarge. 
The ten new member states, along with Romania and Bulgaria, are highly diverse. 
They are also numerous. Were they to join forces, they could in theory collectively 
block unanimous votes, such as those on budgetary matters. Additionally, they have 
the capacity to block votes by qualified majority (108 out of 345 = 31 %). This 
reflects the radical over-representation of smaller states in the EU system, although 
this would change were the Constitution to be ratified (ibid: 207). Yet, as Moravcsik 
and Vachudova (2005:199) argue, as new members become absorbed into the EU 
decision making process, they are more likely to do “little more than reinforce 
existing trends in EU politics”. 
Following the concerns over the relatively poorer states’ accessions, incumbent 
member states were allowed to introduce restrictions on workers from candidate 
countries having access to their labour markets for up to seven years, which most, 
only Sweden, Ireland and the UK opened their markets right from the start, took 
advantage of. To reduce the strain on the budget, it was agreed to phase in 
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agricultural subsidies over a period of nine years before farmers in the candidate 
countries could enjoy the same levels of direct payments (Szczerbiak & Taggart 
2005:3). Yet, perhaps the most controversial issue of the accession of the eastern 
states was the free mobility of persons. Fears of large inflows of immigrants have 
been prominent throughout the member states (de Melo et al 2004:159). Thus, in the 
final round of the negotiations, the EU imposed some conditions based on narrow 
self-interest. After adopting EU standards and rules, the accession states were forced 
to accept unfavourable terms for their accession. They received lower, albeit still 
substantial, subsidies from the CAP and from the Structural and Cohesive funds than 
did previous poorer applicants. Money transferred from the EU budget to new 
members has been capped at 4 per cent of their GDP, an amount far lower than what 
their predecessors obtained. This effectively limits their receipts and protects those of 
the richer members. To the accession states, these terms are unfavourable, but 
according to bargaining logics, the picture is more nuanced. The applicants agree to 
these concessions precisely because the basic benefit offered to them, that of 
membership, is of such great value, which in turn outweighs the costs, particularly if 
compared to exclusion (Schimmelfennig and Vachudova 2005:203). This fits with 
the logic of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’. In a basic bargaining theory perspective, 
relative bargaining power in international negotiations tends to track relative 
preference intensity (ibid: 199). The logic that follows is that those countries to which 
cooperation is most attractive as opposed to unilateral policy making will be more 
positive towards agreement and also more willing to compromise on the margin to 
further such an agreement (ibid). The applicant countries as well as the member states 
benefit from enlargement, although the new applicants benefit more. The asymmetry 
of interdependence, and in turn power, is clearly illustrated by the collective GDP of 
the states who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, who collectively account for no more 
than 5 per cent of the GDP of the EU 15, which is less than any other enlargement of 
the EU (ibid:201). 
Moravcsik and Vachudova argue that it is not the increase in the number of member 
states per se that is the issue, but rather the diversity of interest between them 
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(2005:207). The constraint on EU legislation stems instead from the level of conflict 
of interest among blocks of states. Therefore, the potential threat to effective decision 
making would come from the increasing diversity of member states’ interests, and 
even potential divergent preferences within such blocks (ibid). The concern that the 
increase in member states and the greater diversity of their views will cause a 
breakdown or gridlock of the decision making process is debatable. The more likely 
response is an increase in qualified majority voting (ibid). Moravcsik and Vachudova 
(2005:208) point to three potential reasons why this enlargement is unlikely to cause 
gridlock; firstly that the new members are not “that unruly”. They join existing 
coalitions, which will mean that some of these will inevitably be strengthened, 
however they shall not cause a halt in the decision making process. Secondly, even 
without enlargement, the EU would not be in a dynamic mood. Even the core 
members have no consensual ‘grand project’ for European integration. EU 
governments are instead prioritising policy areas outside of the first pillar, such as 
foreign and monetary policies. Lastly, it is argued that it is precisely within these 
areas of interest outside of the first pillar that flexible institutional mechanisms are 
needed, and so the trend is toward differentiation, multitrack structures and ad hoc 
arrangements (ibid).   
The fifth wave of enlargement, giving accession to many eastern European states has, 
despite the successful integration of these states into the EU, become synonymous 
with fears over migration throughout Europe, which in turn arguably fuelled further 
fears over the proposed 2007 enlargements. The 2004 expansion, despite its positive 
review post enlargement, caused controversy and introduced the debate over 
absorption capacity that has been prominent in EU discourse ever since. 
3.2 Most Recent Enlargements of 2007: Bulgaria and 
Romania  
Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU as its 26th and 27th members on the first of 
January 2007. They first applied for membership in 1995, and both countries started 
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their accession negotiations in February 2000. These were successfully concluded in 
December 2004, with the accession treaty being signed in April the following year 
(European Commission 2006d). According to the most recent monitoring report on 
Bulgaria and Romania of 26 September 2006, the Commission now acknowledges 
the readiness of both countries as satisfactory in handling the obligations EU 
membership carries. In order to address the, albeit limited, areas where further 
measurements are needed, the EU has adopted a package of accompanying steps of 
action.  
Bulgaria and Romania have a combined population of over 30 million people. Their 
entries were conditional on particular reforms being met in order to be allowed into 
the EU. There are major concerns over the accession of these states, both from within 
the general public and member states themselves. The EU will keep certain policy 
areas under surveillance, and have threatened these accession countries with 
economic sanctions should they take such decisions into their own hands. The EU 
will impose harsh penalties if the required reforms are not met within the tight 
schedule set for them. These reforms include tackling corruption and organised crime 
which have been prevalent in the old communist countries. The president of the 
Commission, Josè Barroso, has said there will be a halt in enlargement after the entry 
of Bulgaria and Romania, as this marks the last phase of integration in an EU that has 
been “stretched beyond capacity for now (…) We are not in position to further 
integrate Europe without further institutional reform. There are limits to our 
absorption capacity” (Bilefsky 2006). There were discussions within the EU over 
whether one should allow Bulgaria and Romania entry now, or to wait until January 
2008. The Commission however, feared setbacks in the reform processes in the two 
countries, should it delay their entry for another year (Aftenposten 2006a). Following 
this logic, the EU thought it preferable to include them sooner rather than later.  
The main concerns of the EU in regard to Bulgaria and Romania are fivefold. Firstly, 
the fight against corruption in these countries causes much concern. According to 
Transparency International; Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Turkey all have more 
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widespread corruption than the 10 new members did before joining in 2004 
(International Herald Tribune 2006). Secondly, there are doubts over the capability 
these countries have in handling the money transfers from the CAP and structural 
funds which the EU operates. Thirdly, there is scepticism over their ability to deal 
with issues of food safety, and in order to combat this, the EU will monitor food 
safety programmes. Additionally, the states’ efforts at preventing human trafficking 
will be followed closely (Aftenposten 2006a). Reforms of their judicial systems are 
also considered necessary. The fifth and perhaps most pronounced concern of the 
current EU member states relates to the potential increase in the immigration of 
workers from the new accession countries, which may cause both economic and 
social tensions. Whether these concerns are real or not remains to be seen. In sharp 
contrast to the open door policy which followed from the 2004 enlargement in the 
UK as a result of the Home Office’s prediction that numbers entering from the new 
member states would be low, the UK has now pronounced strict restrictions, or 
‘closed doors’, on immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. This has occurred 
despite the fact that the migration of workers from the 2004 countries has proved to 
have helped strengthen the British economy, filling low paid jobs that were otherwise 
unoccupied. The British position again illustrates the sense of enlargement fatigue. 
Despite the many advantages which have followed the enlargement to 25 member 
states with 470 million citizens, weariness and scepticism reign, both at citizen and 
state level. 
With the recent enlargement, another two eastern, post communist states have entered 
the EU. Potential problems remain, but there seems to be a preference for dealing 
with such problems from the inside, rather than having potential threats on the 
outside of the EU. Strategic security considerations may also have been important as 
a driving force for these countries’ membership. Romania has, for instance, been 
considered a valuable strategic partner, due to its participation in KFOR, Partnership 
for Peace and other regional projects promoting stability in South-East Europe. 
 47
3.3 Further possible Expansion: the Case of Turkey 
The question of Turkish accession to the EU epitomises the discussion of absorption 
capacity prevalent in present EU discourse. The stability of the European continent 
has been seen as the main aim as well as the greatest achievement of the Union. The 
potential inclusion of Turkey can thus be seen as a continuation of this logic, as a part 
of the scheme of fighting instability in Europe’s outskirts, as well as an attempt to 
bridge the east and west of Europe. Turkey represents a diametrically different state, 
in religious, social, and economic terms, to those of the existing EU (Ask 2006), all 
of which contribute to the heated discussion regarding Turkish membership.  
Turkey was first officially recognised as a candidate for membership of the EU in 
1999, and as a result a pre-accession strategy was prepared in 2001. The process 
however, started four decades prior to this, with the Ankara Association Agreement 
signed in 1963 (Avcı 2006:62). The long time span between these events reflects the 
uncertainties and the concerns regarding the question of whether Turkey will, or 
should, join the EU. After the eastern enlargements of 2004, questions over Turkey’s 
accession to the EU intensified. Already in October the same year, the Commission 
announced that Turkey adequately fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, and 
recommended negotiations should start. As a result, the accession negotiations started 
on the 3rd of October 2005.  
Turkish candidacy for EU membership remains a major and problematic challenge 
(Avcı 2006:62). It would be a costly addition for economic as well as geopolitical 
reasons (ibid). Identity issues have also proved to be an important concern; with 
Turkey being viewed as too different from what is regarded “European”. Turkey’s 
status in relation to the EU was always pronounced in more vague terms, compared 
with the CEECs. To illustrate, in the 2004 enlargement phrases like “re-uniting 
Europe”, “a political imperative”, “something that had to be done”, “Europe’s ‘other 
half finally coming home’”, and “not united but reunited” were used (European 
Council 1993, Lundgren 2006:134, Sjursen 2006b:138). Conversely, in talks of 
Turkey an ‘us versus them’ mentality has been prominent. Enlargement to Turkey 
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was never considered a “duty”, nor a “responsibility” (Lundgren 2006:136). In stark 
contrast, Turkey was considered more of a “bridge” between Europe and Asia. 
Herein lays the fundamental question that concerns both the EU and its citizens; is 
Turkey “European”? In Leon Brittan’s (1994 in Lundgren 2006:136) words; “in an 
increasingly interdependent world, Turkey draws increasing strength from its position 
as a bridge between developed and developing neighbours, a bridge between Asia 
and Europe, a bridge between the religions of Islam and Western Europe”. Former 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek (1994 in Lundgren 2006:136) states that 
“Turkey’s Islamic culture is an asset in a continent which has always sought unity in 
diversity and which wishes to improve relations with the Muslim world”. 
There are however, also perceived advantages which would come with Turkish 
accession; and particularly geopolitical and strategic factors would recommend 
Turkish integration into the European family (Lundgren 2006:131). Its unique 
position at the crossroads of the Balkans is crucial (Rehn 2004). Of potential 
importance for the security of Europe is Turkey’s energy supplies and its political, 
economic and military weight (ibid). Turkey has been a loyal NATO ally since 1952, 
however, “the creation of political, economic and social stability on the European 
continent seems more relevant than security defined in its narrow sense with a focus 
on geo-strategic and military issues” (Lundgren 2006:131). 
The obstacles relating to Turkish accession have been more prominent in EU 
discussions than the perceived advantages following from a potential accession. 
Many regard the Turkish question as a key part of the absorption capacity discussion. 
Firstly, there are concerns of economic character. These have to do with major 
structural disparities in both agriculture and industry, macroeconomic imbalances, 
ineffective fiscal transfers, high levels of industrial protectionism as well as the low 
level of social protection more generally (ibid:129). 
Secondly, and perhaps more prominent are the cultural factors. There are concerns 
that the entry of Turkey into the EU would cause the loss of Europe’s identity. This is 
echoed for instance in utterances like Helmut Kohl’s “a Muslim country like Turkey 
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does not belong in Europe”, and Valèry Giscard d’Estaing’s statement that the entry 
of Turkey “would be the end of Europe” (BBC News 2002). This suggests a vision of 
the EU as one of sharing set cultural values that are of non-universal qualities 
(Lundgren 2006:121), contrasting with a rights-based understanding of the EU, where 
eligibility is grounded on common universal values such as democracy, liberty, the 
rule of law and human rights. This latter understanding thus suggests a much wider 
membership base for the EU.  
Thirdly, Turkey’s size and relative poverty exacerbate the problem (Economist 
2005). Fears arise over whether, if accession will be granted, Turkey would 
automatically gain a considerable weight in decision making, due to its population 
size, and also whether Turkey may engage in coalitions with other “eastern” 
members, providing a significant voting bloc. The size of the country also inevitably 
leads to concerns over immigration, most notably the cost of policing this, and the 
social and economic effect this will have on ‘core Europe’. 
Fourthly, there are international concerns over issues of human rights in Turkey. 
There is the question of the Armenian genocide and Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge 
its past, which is usually mentioned in conjunction with accusations about Turkey’s 
record of human rights (Sunday Herald 2005). The French Parliament has taken a 
particular interest in the Armenian case, approving a bill making it a crime to deny 
that Ottoman Turks perpetrated genocide against the Armenian people in the years 
1915-1917. It follows from this, that should Turkey want to join the Union, it will 
have to acknowledge its genocidal past. Whether this is merely a provocation or a 
tactical move to further delay Turkish accession is debatable.  
Lastly, there are concerns over Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge Cyprus’s 
sovereignty. The Enlargement Commissioner Rehn warned that failing to make 
concessions over Cyprus could harm Turkey’s chances for membership. There are 
now ongoing negotiations led by Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja with the 
aim of convincing Ankara to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships, this in exchange 
for lifting an EU trade embargo on Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus (BBC News 
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2006). The fact that ethnic conflicts and nationalistic movements could have a 
potential spillover effect into the EU cause major concern (Lundgren 2006:132), 
particularly regarding the recognition of a Kurdish homeland and the case of Cyprus. 
Even if EU relations with Turkey date back to the early days of the European project, 
the question of Turkish EU membership has been long debated and the country’s 
place in Europe remains contested (ibid:121). The potential accession of Turkey 
would suggest an EU based upon criteria of rights rather than culture (Avcı 2006:63). 
Lundgren (2006) has compared Romania and Turkey in regards to EU membership, 
and she argues that Turkey scored higher than Romania on both democratic and 
economic indicators prior to the EU’s decision to enlarge eastward in 1993. It follows 
that the enlargements the EU makes cannot merely be interpreted with reference to 
utility calculations or concerns for human rights and democracy. As from a utility 
perspective, we would assume that one wanted the accession of candidates of which 
potential economic or security gains were considered to be particularly high. On the 
other hand, a rights-based perspective would focus more on the candidate’s concern 
for human rights and democracy. Neither criterion seems to fully explain the reason 
why the EU has enlarged to the CEEC but not included Turkey. This may have 
something to do with a kinship-based duty, Lundgren (2006:122) suggests. In this 
sense, concerns rage over the possible dilution of the current level of integration and 
import of possible political instability into the ‘core’ Europe (Pridham 2006:399). 
This reflects the wider worry about the cultural compatibility of Turkey vs ‘Europe’ 
(Kaiser and Elvert 2004:1). 
3.4 The Emergence of the Absorption Capacity Problem 
This wave of enlargements and the prospect of the future accession of Turkey led to 
the introduction of the absorption capacity issue in the EU. Like other rounds of 
enlargements, expansion to the east was seen as profitable because it was considered 
to bring stable, long-term economic and geopolitical benefits. Yet, the costs and 
benefits of enlargement are often unevenly distributed, which may explain parts of 
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the politics that has surrounded it (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005:198). The 
benefits of these enlargements were often seen in a long term perspective, whereas 
the costs were viewed as a short term effect, contributing to the apprehension 
surrounding them. 
The very essence of enlargement came to be contested, for three reasons. Firstly, the 
decline in support for enlargement among EU voters caused concern. Opinion polls 
still show a narrow majority in favour of enlargement, yet in some countries the 
mood turned sharply against further expansion. Enlargement Commissioner Rehn has 
complained that the various national governments make little effort to paint out the 
advantages which follow from enlargement. Secondly, and at least partly in response 
to the 2004 expansion, EU governments have lost enthusiasm for enlargement, 
particularly in countries such as France, Germany, and Austria. Lastly, the failure to 
ratify the constitutional treaty in 2006 was interpreted as a negative reaction to 
contemporary enlargement. The lack of an institutional settlement may also prove a 
bar to enlargement. The Nice treaty provided votes and parliamentary seats for 
Romania and Bulgaria, but not for Croatia, which is the next country in line.  
There were a number of extensive challenges and risks which the 2004 enlargement 
posed that may have led to the occurrence of the absorption capacity discussion. 
Following the 2004 entry of the CEECs, concerns over the growing economic, 
institutional, cultural, as well as linguistic heterogeneity of the EU have been 
increasingly prominent in EU discussions. The 2004 enlargement represented an 
unprecedented challenge for the EU in dealing with the sheer number of the candidate 
countries, the diversity they represented and particularly the structural and financial 
consequences their admittance to the EU would have (Esposito 1999:97). Most 
prominent were concerns regarding the lack of a European collective identity 
(Scharpf 1999:187). The relatively poorer economic conditions of the newer member 
states, it has been suggested, require substantial reforms, and subsequent changes to 
key common policies such as the common agricultural policy and the structural 
funds. The achievement of consensus decision making proves more difficult with a 
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substantially wider member base, and there are concerns that this could potentially 
lead to a weakened EU if no adequate institutional changes are made (Baun 
2000:229).  
The problems which the EU now experiences as a result of this can be said to consist 
of two elements. Firstly, the EU as an institution, or as a collection of institutions, 
faces more challenges than it has the capacity to deal with in its current state. 
Secondly, the EU is subject to extensive pressure to solve these problems within a 
short period of time by transforming its present framework, or at least developing it, 
and thus avoiding irreversible damage. The perception of a crisis may indicate that 
the project of eastern enlargement has exceeded the perceived capacity of the EU in 
its present institutional condition.  
There are many challenges posed by the increasing size of the Union in itself, as the 
existing institutions were by and large designed and established to cater for the 
original community of six countries, which cause major concern that they will simply 
fail to work with twenty-seven members (Baldwin 2004:14). The six were also a 
relatively homogenous community, politically as well as economically. The 2004 
enlargement represents significantly different economies and political systems into 
the EU. Particularly concerning to many is the CAP and structural funds that 
subsidise infrastructure and capital investment in Europe’s poorer regions, which 
together accounts for some 80% of the Union’s budget. An automatic application of 
these to the newer member states would require a doubling of the EU budget. Some 
of these institutional issues were looked at in the Amsterdam Treaty, although the 
reforms proved too difficult to agree upon; creating the so-called “Amsterdam left-
overs”. There were later attempts to solve this in another IGC, and some reforms 
were agreed upon in 2000 with the Treaty of Nice. Nevertheless, issues of 
institutional inadequacy remain unsolved. 
The 2004 enlargements also prompted concerns over the depth of the EU, suggesting 
that there has been only limited transfer of national sovereignty from the member 
states. Additionally, the enlargements led to concerns over “hostage taking” in the 
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decision making process, due to the unanimity rule and the veto opportunities of the 
newer, smaller countries. More compromise solutions and difficulties in coming to 
agreements are expected in the future as a consequence of this.  
The inadequacy of the EU’s political structures (Eichengreen & Frieden 1998:296) 
has also been pointed to as a consequence of enlargement. Even if the EEA 
introduced majority voting for Single Market topics (Art. 100a), the principle of 
unanimity (Art. 100) still applies for many decisions. Consensus through unanimity is 
still an unwritten rule. There are concerns that the votes granted to small and large 
countries in the Council (Art. 148 sec 2) and the European Parliament, as well as at 
the top of the Commission, clearly favour small countries, Eichengreen and Frieden 
argue. This may impair the position of the larger countries and thus concerns that the 
new, smaller eastern countries will block decisions appear. The concern is that the 
larger the EU in terms of number of member states, the smaller the set of 
arrangements on which they are all willing or able to agree upon, and subsequently 
that this will increase the dissatisfaction with the system, also for those states which 
traditionally have favoured more integration (Monitoring European Integration 6 
1995:13). A larger degree of flexibility in the system will be necessary to allow for 
alternatives in an increasingly less homogeneous EU, but then on the other hand, 
increased flexibility will thus also be considered problematic as it may undermine the 
gains already achieved in the EU.  
The Council of Ministers was substantially expanded by the 2004 and 2007 entrants. 
There is expected to be an increase in the time consumed by every country expressing 
their views, and the need for translations will increase. The 2004 enlargement also 
substantially increased the number of poorer member states (Deubner 1999:122), 
causing concerns that their cumulative weight may lead them to exercise more power 
by increasing their voting weight and gaining blocking minority. Reforms of voting 
procedures have been muted, most notably the Herman model (ibid) of double 
majority voting. This requires a majority of both the population of the EU plus a 
majority of the qualified majority votes of the Members States, but the coalition of 
 54 
the poor, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, would still gain power quickly. This might 
motivate the states to choose the least controversial reform, namely to assess the 
requirement of total populations’ majority to that of the present qualified weighted 
majority of states, for a qualified majority to come about in the Council.  
The purpose of looking at the history of European enlargement follows the logic that 
the prevailing uncertainty over the political essence and meaning of the EU that 
colours the EU discourse today is comparable to that of the past. EU enlargement is 
more of the rule than an exception, having been a natural part of the Union’s agenda 
since the very start. Now that the EU has grown to comprise 27 members, it is said to 
be the “most successful example of peaceful regime change in our time (…) The 
advance toward liberal democracy has gone hand in hand with their advance towards 
membership of what is now the European Union" (Ash 2007a). The additions up to 
2004 went relatively smoothly, not causing much controversy in comparison to the 
enlargement of 2004, nor did they lead to discussions of absorption capacity. 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007 and there are hopes that 
negotiations with Turkey will stimulate further reforms in the country, and thus lead 
Turkey closer to potential accession. The EU has also acknowledged the future 
potential membership perspective of the countries of the western Balkans. The 
Commission has “issued a positive opinion on Croatia’s application” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:3). The decision to open negotiations with 
Croatia has been welcomed, as has the decision to grant the former Yugoslav country 
Macedonia status as a candidate country (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2006). At the 
Thessaloniki summit of 2003, the other countries of the Western Balkans were given 
a European “perspective”. Albania is close to finalising negotiations for a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and the Council has decided to start similar 
negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid).  
It is therefore apparent that the sense of enlargement fatigue currently facing the EU 
is not a singular event, the history of enlargement has shown that when enlargement 
is introduced, scepticism has, more often than not, followed. Yet, following the 
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argument in chapter two, despite scepticism, absorption capacity only entered the 
discourse after the major eastern enlargement of 2004. 
 56 
4. Handling the problem of Absorption Capacity – 
Clarification and Definition 
Within the previous chapters, it has been argued that absorption capacity is a product 
of the enlargement related problems that the EU has faced. This however, was not a 
prominent concept in EU discourse prior to 2003; but has become increasingly 
important in present EU discussions. Following concerns that absorption capacity 
was too vague a concept to be of any use, the EU has now taken a more structured 
approach; and both the Commission and the European Parliament have published 
reports where they seek to clarify and define the term, point to where solutions are 
needed and suggest measures to do this. The media has also taken an interest in the 
debate over absorption capacity, and as such, their approach to the subject is of 
importance in how absorption is portrayed and the actual consequences it has for 
Europe in terms of the public reaction to this. In this chapter, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the media’s approaches towards 
absorption capacity will be discussed, followed by a conceptualisation of absorption 
capacity with a particular focus on legitimacy and effectiveness. The next chapter 
will offer an empirical discussion of the term, tentatively investigating the actual 
level of absorption capacity in the EU. At the heart of both approaches to absorption 
capacity lie the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness and these shall be discussed in 
due turn. 
The European Commission released its Enlargement Strategy report on 8 November 
2006, describing the remaining challenges related to enlargement and pointing to the 
most important aspects that need to be dealt with. Compared with the European 
Parliament’s resolution, the Commission’s strategy seems less specific and vaguer 
throughout, whereas the Parliament’s resolution is more definite suggesting a number 
of particular measures to conquer the problem of absorption capacity. In discussing 
the perspective taken by the media, the focus will be on the Economist articles as 
these provide a particularly clear and definite response to the concerns of absorption 
capacity. These have also been the only ones I have found that have focused 
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particularly on the term absorption capacity, and not only enlargement fatigue in a 
more general manner. 
Throughout this thesis, the term “absorption” capacity has been used as was 
introduced in the Copenhagen criteria. Yet, as best explained in the Parliament’s 
resolution, but which is also mentioned in the Commission’s report, there seems to be 
a new consensus “that the term ‘absorption capacity’ does not suitably convey the 
idea which it aims to express, inasmuch as the EU does not in any way absorb its 
members, and therefore proposes that this expression be changed to “integration 
capacity”, which better reflects the character of EU membership” (European 
Parliament 2006:3). This change in language will be discussed in the following. 
4.1 The Commission’s Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2006 – 200710 report 
Following from the increased usage of the term over the last couple of years, a calling 
for a clarification of absorption capacity prevailed in EU circles; and resulting from 
this the Commission published a report on 8 November 2006 where attempts to tackle 
questions of absorption capacity were presented. The report states that absorption 
capacity should be understood as an attempt to measure the EU’s, as well as the 
existing members’, readiness to accede new members (European Commission 
2006c). 
The report uses the term integration capacity rather than absorption capacity, and 
defines it as dealing with the issue of whether the EU can take in new members at a 
given moment or in a given period, without jeopardising the political and policy 
objectives established by the Treaties (ibid), as such, stating that integration capacity 
is first and foremost a functional concept. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council 
                                              
10 COM (2006)649 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council; Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007 Including annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members. 
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concluded that “the EU’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”. The report by the 
Commission, following the line set out in the Commission’s 2005 Strategy Paper and 
confirmed by the June 2006 European Council, states that the pace of enlargement 
must take into consideration the EU’s integration capacity (emphasis added) (ibid). It 
further declares that “the EU’s absorption capacity, or rather integration capacity, is 
determined by the development of the EU’s policies and institutions (…)” (emphasis 
added) (ibid: 17). The rather here seems to imply that integration capacity is regarded 
as a more favourable term than absorption capacity. Absorption capacity, as stated, 
follows from the language used in the Copenhagen Criteria as of 1993.  
Is this divertion from ‘absorption’ simply a semantic one? Or is it an attempt to widen 
the phrase and dilute any negative connotations related to the ‘absorption’ part? This 
illustrates the difficulties inherent in defining such a concept, and the usage as such of 
absorption capacity within an EU context. The attempt to shift the focus from the 
term ‘absorption’ is perhaps the result of a preference to move away from an 
emotionally charged term. In this respect, integration capacity can be seen as an 
attempt to soften the negative connotations associated with absorption capacity, used 
particularly by forces opposed to further enlargement. In this sense, it may be 
suggested that absorption capacity may have become incompatible with a positive 
outlook towards enlargement. 
The report points to the advantages of enlargement so far, showing an enduring value 
as “one of the EU’s most effective policies, successfully contributing to peace, 
stability and democratic development throughout the continent” (ibid). The 
integration of the 2004 countries has been successful and the EU’s institutions have 
continued to function effectively. There have been clear economic benefits, such as 
the rapid “catching up” of the new member states. The old member states have 
benefited from new trade and investment opportunities. The adoption of the euro by 
the new member states, which started with Slovenia on 1 January 2007, has been 
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progressive, further contributing to this positive trend. The latest enlargements have 
as such acted as a catalyst for economic growth and modernisation in the EU (ibid: 
4). More concrete benefits are seen in the three member states Ireland, Sweden, and 
the UK, which introduced the free movement of labour upon the accession of the ten 
new member states, in terms of increased national income and tax revenues and 
shrinkage of the grey economy. Workers from new member states have helped 
overcome skills shortages in the labour market and have adapted well to their new 
cultural environment. Following from these positive experiences, another five states 
have opened their labour markets and two others have partially opened them11. 
Overall, the fifth enlargement has been a considerable success. Over 100 million new 
EU citizens, with rising incomes, will help to drive the European economy forward. 
Enlargement has brought higher standards of democracy and the rule of law in 
Europe (ibid: 5). 
4.1.1 The Commission’s proposed measures 
The Commission’s report introduces an approach to how the EU ensures its capacity 
to maintain the momentum of European integration while enlargement continues 
(emphasis added) (ibid: 20). This capacity has three main components; the EU’s 
institutions, its common policies, and the budget. Overall, the EU needs to ensure that 
its institutions continue to act effectively, that its policies meet their goals, and that its 
budget is commensurate with its objectives and with its financial resources also 
following enlargements (ibid). 
Firstly, the report states that the EU does not need new institutional arrangements 
simply for the sake of enlargement; but that it needs them to ensure that the current 
EU can function better. In particular, decision making needs to remain both effective 
and accountable. In previous enlargements, the integration of the acceding countries 
into the institutions formed part of the accession negotiations. The resulting 
                                              
11 Full opening May 2006: Spain, Greece, Finland, Portugal, July 2006: Italy. Partial opening: Belgium, France. 
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adjustments to the institutional provisions were made in the respective Accession 
Treaties. In the latest wave of enlargement, the 2004 and 2007 countries were 
preceded by institutional reforms based on the Nice Treaty (ibid: 20). This treaty 
provided for up to 27 states, which included Bulgaria and Romania, but stipulated 
that when the EU consists of 27 member states, the number of members of the 
Commission shall be less than the number of the member states. Further, the number 
of members of the Commission is to be set by the Council, acting unanimously (ibid). 
The Treaty of Nice did not make provisions for further adaptations to the composition 
and functioning of the EU institutions after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 
The allocation of seats in the European Parliament and the weighing of votes in the 
Council are clearly central to the EU’s capacity to take decisions and therefore, 
before any further enlargement, the EU will have to decide on the scope and 
substance of those institutional reforms (ibid:21). Of a more practical character and 
relating to the functioning of the institutions is the use of languages, which will have 
particular implications. A new institutional settlement should be reached by the time 
the next new member is likely to be ready to join the EU, which would be Croatia 
(ibid). 
Secondly, EU policies are of importance regards the capacity to integrate or absorb 
new members, which also affects the effectiveness of the EU. “The Union needs to 
continue developing and implementing common policies in all areas as it enlarges, 
and assessment of the impact of enlargement on EU policies will take place at all key 
stages of the enlargement process”(ibid). In the future, the opinions of the 
Commission on each country’s application will include an assessment of the impact 
of that accession on EU policies, the report states.  
Thirdly, the budget is of increased importance. The EU needs to be in a position 
where it can continue to finance its policies in a sustainable manner. The impact of 
enlargement on the EU budget will be “carefully assessed”, and each Commission 
opinion on a country’s application for EU membership will “provide estimates of 
budgetary impact” (ibid: 22). The report further states that before any future 
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accession, the EU “will need to decide on the overall budgetary means required”, and 
the Commission will propose a package of necessary financial measures (ibid). 
Regards accession negotiations, the Commission will provide substantial assessments 
of the impact of accession on key policy areas, such as the movement of persons, 
border management, agriculture, and cohesion policy (ibid:21). 
The report states that the EU enlargement policy is based on three principles; 
consolidation of commitments, conditionality and communication. Consolidation 
stresses the cautiousness of the EU in assuming any new commitments, at the same 
time honouring its existing commitments toward countries already in the enlargement 
process (European Commission 2006c:5). “Rigorous but fair conditionality is applied 
to all candidate and potential candidate countries, and steps forward will depend on 
each country’s own progress in meeting the necessary conditions at each stage of the 
accession process, helping to consolidate reforms and prepare new member states to 
fulfil their obligations upon accession”(ibid). Emphasising legitimacy considerations, 
the report states that “for enlargement to be a success, the EU must ensure the support 
of its citizens” (emphasis added) (ibid), as member states need to take the lead in 
communicating effectively the benefits that enlargement offers to EU citizens.  
Ensuring that the candidate countries fulfil the rigorous conditions is of importance. 
High-quality preparation by candidate countries facilitates their smooth integration 
into the EU (ibid: 22). As part of the pre-accession strategy, the Commission will 
closely monitor the progress made by each enlargement state, which in turn will be 
based on political, economic, and acquis criteria for membership. Based on these 
findings, the Commission will propose short and medium term reform priorities for 
the Accession or European Partnerships covering each country. 2007 will also see the 
introduction of a single new financial instrument to cover all pre-accession needs, 
which in turn will make EU support for membership preparations more effective; the 
Instrument of Pre-Accession (ibid). In the future, there will be a closer link between 
progress in political reforms and the overall pace of the negotiations. Prior to 
accession, it is important that the candidate country is a functioning market economy 
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able to compete in the internal market, which will be the target of pre-accession 
assistance. Institutional reform is needed to improve the effectiveness of the decision-
making of the enlarged EU, in order to ensure it can maintain its capacity to act and 
decide according to its institutions, respect its budgetary limits, and implement 
ambitious common policies that function well and achieve their objectives (ibid).  
The use of benchmarks is suggested in the report. During negotiations of accession 
questions, the candidate country commit to applying the entire body of EU legislation 
and policies, known as the acquis. They will then have to accept and implement the 
acquis, and adhere to the political objectives of the Treaties (ibid: 6). Benchmarks are 
introduced here as a result of lessons learnt from the fifth enlargement; and the 
purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing incentives for the 
candidate country to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage. Together with the 
negotiation framework, the establishment of benchmarks in opening or closing 
negotiation chapters will ensure a rigorous approach to accession negotiations. 
The report also stresses the supporting of increased transparency, recommending 
screening reports, benchmarking for opening negotiation chapters as well as the final 
EU common positions to be made public; in general an expanding of its support for 
civil society dialogue. It suggests an introduction of more “people-to-people” 
contacts in areas of education, research, and culture, and the continuation of 
monitoring public opinion on enlargement and as such listening to the concerns of the 
public. For this, developing user-friendly information in everyday language will be 
crucial (ibid: 10).  
4.1.2 The Commission’s Conclusions 
In preparing previous enlargements, the Commission has examined, in separate 
policy papers, the implications for the EU of issues common to several applications 
for membership. The focus has mainly been on strengthening EU institutions, 
furthering economic integration and developing common policies as pre-requisites for 
enlargement (ibid: 19). 
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Democratic legitimacy is paramount in the EU enlargement process. The decision 
leading to a state’s accession is taken unanimously by the democratically elected 
governments of the member states and candidate countries, and national parliaments 
ratify the decision. The European Parliament, whose members are directly elected, 
gives its assent (ibid: 23). Furthermore, for any policy including enlargement, the EU 
has to win the support of its citizens. Therefore, it needs to communicate better the 
advantages, as well as the challenges, of enlargement. The Commission aims for 
improving the availability of factual information in user-friendly form. Better 
transparency will bring the enlargement process closer to the citizens (ibid: 24).  
The conclusions from the report include firstly that the general enlargement policy of 
the EU continues to be based on the three principles of consolidation, conditionality, 
and communication (European Commission 2006c:15). The EU’s capacity to 
integrate new members is determined by two factors. Firstly, the maintenance of the 
“momentum to reinforce and deepen European integration by ensuring the EU’s 
capacity to function” is crucial. Secondly, the ensuring that “the candidate countries 
are ready to take on the obligations of membership when they join by fulfilling the 
rigorous conditions set” is important, which is assessed by the Commission on the 
basis of strict conditionality (ibid). The report aims to reinforce the democratic basis 
for the enlargement process; in the interest of all stakeholders to avoid a gap between 
policy makers on one side, that is, how effective they are, and the public on the other 
side, that is, how legitimate enlargement is seen as being (ibid:24). 
At the present, it seems unlikely that any “large group of countries will in the future 
accede simultaneously” (ibid: 18). The European public needs to be ready for further 
enlargement, with a better understanding of the issues at stake. This will enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the process in terms of public perception; and as such, the 
approach presented in the Commission’s paper is based on the foundation of ensuring 
the EU’s capacity to maintain the momentum of European integration and at the same 
time making sure that candidate countries fulfil the rigorous conditions (ibid). 
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The Commission’s report seems to put more focus on the effectiveness rather than 
legitimacy of the EU as factors important regarding absorption capacity. The four 
main measures of new institutional arrangements, the continuation of implementing 
EU policies, the increased importance of the budget and the introduction of 
benchmarks point to this. There is limited attention on issues of legitimacy, even 
given that the improvement of the transparency of the Union is mentioned. 
4.2 The Parliament’s Resolution on the Institutional 
aspects of the EU’s capacity to integrate new member 
states12 
This resolution presents the European Parliament’s response to calls for a 
clarification of absorption capacity and was published a month after the 
Commission’s strategy report (December 2006). In its introductionary comments, the 
resolution states that whilst the European Council of June 2005 reaffirmed its 
commitment to full implementation of the Thessaloniki agenda, and that of June 2006 
reaffirmed its intention to honour the existing commitments to the South-East 
European countries concerning enlargement; the Parliament still emphasises the 
“need to ensure that the Union is able to function politically, economically and 
institutionally as it enlarges” (European Parliament 2006:1). The resolution of the 
Parliament is in comparison to the strategy report of the Commission more structured 
and definite in its proposed measures. The Parliament resolution puts forward 17 
specific measures for enhancing the institutional aspects of ‘integration’ capacity.  
The basis for accession to the EU has since 1993 been compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria and should remain so for future accessions. Reinforcing this, the 
European Council of 15-16 June 2006 decided that “the pace of enlargement must 
take the Union’s capacity to absorb new members and further ways of improving the 
quality of the enlargement process on the basis of the positive experiences 
                                              
12 2006/226(INI) 
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accumulated so far” on the basis of a report “on all relevant aspects pertaining to the 
Union’s absorption capacity” (emphasis added) (ibid). According to the European 
Council, the report should also cover the issue of present and future perceptions of 
enlargement by citizens and should take into account the need to explore the 
enlargement process adequately to the public (ibid). 
The resolution points to the importance of preserving the effectiveness of the EU 
decision making, and that “although every enlargement of the Union has brought 
about changes in its institutional, political, and financial framework” (ibid), such 
changes have not been sufficient. The Parliament considers that the notion of 
absorption capacity implies that after enlargement, European institutions will be able 
to function properly and take effective decisions in a democratic manner in 
accordance with their specific procedures. Secondly, it argues that the financial 
resources of the EU will be sufficient to adequately finance its activities, and thirdly 
that the Union will be able to successfully develop its policies and attain its goals, in 
order to pursue its political project.  
In order to ensure its integration capacity, the Union must decide on the scope and 
substance of the reforms that it needs to achieve before any future accession takes 
place; its evaluation in this regard must be conducted throughout the key stages of the 
enlargement process, taking into account the possible impact that new Member States 
will have on its institutional, financial and decisional capabilities.  
The resolution finds that absorption capacity does not suitably convey the idea which 
it aims to express, in as much as the EU does not in any way absorb its members. It 
therefore proposes that the term is changed to integration capacity, which “better 
reflects the character of EU membership” (ibid). Despite this change in both the 
Commission and the Parliament’s usage, I will continue to use the phrase absorption 
capacity throughout for reasons of clarity and more obviously in that it is the life of 
this particular term that I am investigating. 
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4.2.1 The Parliament’s proposed measures 
The primary focus of the resolution made by the Parliament is on institutional 
aspects, stressing that before any future enlargement, a reform of the EU is essential 
to enable it to work more effectively, more transparently and more democratically. In 
this light, any further expansion will necessitate the suggested institutional reforms.  
The Parliament also put emphasis on the financial consequences of enlargement, 
notably on the budget. The European Council of 16-17 December 2004 in Brussels 
stated that “accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose accession 
could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded after the 
establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with 
possible consequential financial reforms” (ibid). 
The implementation of policies is related to effectiveness in the EU’s absorption 
capacity, as the notion of integration capacity entails the challenge of adapting the 
EU to accommodate its new Members. According to the resolution, that “challenge 
currently remains unresolved, in particular following the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands as this treaty would enable the 
EU to function efficiently and democratically with the challenge of the financial 
resources still to be tackled”(ibid).  
The Parliament’s resolution states that any further enlargement will necessitate 
several reforms, and suggests in the resolution 17 particular institutional measures, 
which in turn will increase the absorption capacity of the Union. The most important 
of these in my view include the adoption of a new system of qualified majority voting 
(QMV), which will enhance the ability of the Council to reach decisions. Related to 
this is the proposed extension of the matters to which QMV applies. Further, an 
extension of the participation of the European Parliament on equal footing with the 
Council in budgetary and legislative matters is suggested. Following from the 
increased number of member states, a modification of the rota system of the 
Presidencies of the European Council and the Council is proposed. Additionally, a 
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creation of the post of a Minister of Foreign Affairs is debated. As noted by the 
Commission, there are calls for further modification of the composition of the 
Commission beyond that ordained by the Treaty of Nice; these suggest strengthening 
the role of the President of the Commission and the reinforcement of his democratic 
legitimacy through election by the European Parliament.  
The establishment of mechanisms for the involvement of national parliaments in the 
scrutiny of the Union’s actions is also proposed, as is modification of the procedure 
for amendment of the Treaties in order to simplify it, and render it more effective. 
This would also enhance the EU’s democratic character and transparency. It is further 
suggested an adoption of a clause enabling Member States to withdraw from the 
Union.  
Furthermore, the resolution presents five “other” (ibid) aspects to improve the 
Union’s absorption capacity apart from the necessary institutional reforms. Further 
enlargements will necessitate modifications in other important aspects of its structure, 
such as the adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
improvement of the solidarity policies between the member states. The revision of its 
financial framework and a redefinition of several of its policies are also necessary in 
order to enable the Union to implement the Lisbon Strategy. Further, a reinforcement 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy is suggested, which is the proposed 
instrument for establishing mutually beneficial relationships with those European 
countries that have no immediate prospect for accession, either because they do not 
fulfil the conditions for membership or because they choose not to join.  
Secondly, the resolution accentuates that the above reforms should go alongside 
efforts to increase public acceptance of enlargement and as such recall the 
responsibility of Europe’s political leaders in explaining to the public the goals and 
mutual advantages of enlargement. This mirrors what was said by the Commission’s 
strategy report. 
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Thirdly, the Parliament reiterates that any decision to admit a new Member State 
should be taken through a procedure that includes numerous safeguards, namely a 
unanimous decision by all member states on the opening and closing of accession 
negotiations, the approval of the European Parliament and the ratification of each 
Accession Treaty by all member states. Again, as emphasised in the paper by the 
Commission, the Parliament stresses the importance of legitimacy safeguards in 
facilitating further enlargement. 
Fourthly, the signing of an Accession Treaty by the member states’ governments 
means that those governments are fully committed to acting accordingly in order to 
ensure that the process of ratifying that Treaty is brought to a successful conclusion. 
Lastly, the resolution points to the fact that the assent of the Parliament, required for 
the Council to act under Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union on the 
accession of new Member States, should still apply to the decision to open 
negotiations.  
4.2.2 Conclusions of the resolution  
The Parliament reaffirms its commitment to enlargement as an historic opportunity to 
ensure peace, security, stability, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as economic 
growth and prosperity in Europe. The resolution further stresses that the EU must be 
able to adapt its institutional, financial and political structure in due time, in order to 
avoid causing unexpected delays in the accession of candidate countries once it is 
established that they satisfy all the conditions for membership. 
In a similar vein to the Commission’s report, the Parliament states that the Treaty of 
Nice does not provide an adequate basis for further enlargements. The resolution also 
endorses its commitment to the Constitutional Treaty, which already offers solutions 
to most of the reforms needed. It further warns that any attempt to foster a piecemeal 
implementation of parts of the constitutional package deal may endanger the global 
compromise upon which it rests. 
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There is the same set of time constraints noted in both the resolution of the 
Parliament and in the Commission’s report, and the timetable established by the 
European Council of 15-16 June 2006, which all seek a solution to the constitutional 
crisis by the second semester of 2008 at the latest, effectively in time for Croatia’s 
potential accession. The resolution reaffirms its commitment to achieving a 
constitutional settlement for the EU as quickly as possible, and in any case before the 
citizens of the Union are called upon to cast their votes in the European elections in 
2009.  
Like the Commission’s report, the Parliament’s resolution stresses that the concerns 
over the Union’s institutions and enabling them to work more effectively are pivotal. 
Yet at the same time, the resolution stresses that any measures need be done 
democratically and with the support of the European citizens. As such, legitimacy 
and effectiveness go hand in hand, and where the Parliament puts more focus on 
concerns of legitimacy than the Commission does in their report, measures to combat 
the Union’s effectiveness seem predominant in the response to the concerns over the 
absorption capacity of the EU.  
4.3 Absorption Capacity and the Media 
In this section, the media will primarily be represented by articles from the 
Economist. I acknowledge that the selection of sources here ideally should have been 
broader, but the specific nature of the subject under study seems only discussed by 
the Economist in depth, more commonly one finds vaguer discussions of enlargement 
fatigue. As such, the sources used in this section are seen as valid, enabling one to 
contextualise the concept, as opposed to the more detailed and structured analysis 
provided by the Commission and the Parliament.   
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4.3.1 How absorption capacity is defined and understood 
The Economist (2006) suggests two ways of understanding absorption capacity. It 
firstly focuses on technical consequences, seeing absorption capacity in a narrower, 
more technical sense. The attention is on issues such as the budgetary implications 
following enlargement, and the number of commissioners given that the current 
Treaty of Nice stated that the size of the Commission would need to be adjusted when 
the Union would reach 27 members. Secondly, absorption capacity can be understood 
as representing societal and popular concerns, stressing the importance of the 
general public’s support for enlargement to be a success. Following from this, the 
Economist (2006) warns that absorption capacity may easily be used as a phrase for 
those who wish to stop the enlargement process, and in particular, those opposed to 
prevent Turkish accession. 
In keeping with the above doubts over absorption capacity, the Economist (2006) 
argues that the debate over the term misunderstands the nature of the EU. Absorption 
capacity is fundamentally misleading when applied to an organisation such as the EU 
because it was originally applied to development economics, and refers to a country’s 
ability to make effective use of external assistance (Economist 2006). This can be 
exemplified by countries receiving foreign aid, an ability which in turn can be 
measured to a certain extent. Contrary to this, the absorption capacity of the EU 
cannot be measured in this way, the Economist (2006) argues. Rather than 
“absorbing” its members, the EU simply “adds” them, it states. Furthermore, 
absorption capacity seems unfitting in that it sees the EU as a club with a fixed 
amount of benefits that get used up when adding new members. Conversely, the 
Economist argues, “it is more like a network in which the benefits of membership 
increase as more members join” (ibid).   
This seems to fully reject the conception of the EU as a club, and argue instead that 
the EU is a network. In terms of membership, a club implies limitedness whereas the 
network implies a more open understanding of this. Yet, as the discussion on 
enlargement has shown, the EU does not seem to be fully open membership wise, as 
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is particularly evident in questions of Turkish membership. As such, it is important to 
acknowledge both the club properties of the EU as well as the network aspects 
regarding absorption capacity. 
4.3.2 Absorption capacity; a problem or a pseudo-problem? 
The Economist’s focus on absorption capacity suggests that the Union does seem to 
be suffering from enlargement fatigue, manifesting itself particularly in institutional 
problems. This does not imply an agreement with the use of absorption capacity; 
indeed their position on the heuristic merits of the term would seem to mirror that of 
the Commission and the Parliament, suggesting that the debate concerning absorption 
capacity is of a pseudo-nature and is better understood as a debate over integration 
capacity. In this sense, the media has recognised that absorption capacity has come to 
assume negative connotations, and that this is a potential weakness in the concept and 
its merits. It shall in the following be discussed how the Economist views 
institutional aspects as having contributed to the term absorption capacity. 
Institutional concerns; the Constitution and QMV 
As many as 12 governments promised to put the European constitution to a 
referendum before ratifying it, including Britain, France, and the Netherlands. “With 
so many national governments mired in unpopularity and economic troubles, it was 
scarcely surprising that opinion polls in both countries [France and the Netherlands] 
started to turn against the Treaty. On May 29th French voters rejected it with 55 to 45 
%, and on June 1st Dutch voters turned it down by 62 to 38%” (Economist 2007a). 
The rejections took Europe by surprise as “it was the first time that two countries had 
said no simultaneously, the first time any big country had done so, and the first time a 
founder member had rejected anything” (ibid). A few weeks later an EU summit 
failed to agree on the budget for 2007-13, and so the sense of crisis was complete. 
The Financial Times argues that the Union’s supranational institutions, and in 
particular the Commission, have to fight for their place in the hierarchy of the EU. 
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The requirement of consensus with 27 member states determines whether effective 
action can be taken on issues such as energy and foreign policy (Wall 2007). A small 
degree of absorption capacity in the EU may enhance the danger that consensus could 
mean the policy of the lowest common denominator. Europe, however, needs to agree 
on major policies on energy, climate change, poverty, action against crime and 
terrorism, peacekeeping and a coherent European foreign policy. Some of the actions 
need to remain in the hands of national governments; others require a common 
European approach. It is argued that it would be preferable if national governments 
were to be more positive to the increased use of decision-making based on the 
principle of QMV, “where the Europe of results requires it” (ibid). Effective decision 
making with 27 states all with veto power is inherently cumbersome (Economist 
2007e). As this would be improved by a settlement on QMV in the Constitution, the 
importance of an early agreement on the successor to the Constitutional Treaty as a 
first step in the enunciation of a new vision for Europe is repeatedly stressed.  
The story of the constitutional treaty may be tedious, yet relevant to the EU’s sense of 
current turmoil (Economist 2007a). The process started with the Single European Act 
in 1986, extending QMV to various policy areas as this seemed to be the only way to 
push through legislation needed for the 1992 single-market programme. Later, the 
Maastricht treaty of 1992 promised to create a single currency by 1999, and also set 
up a common foreign and security policy and new arrangements for co-operating on 
justice and home affairs (ibid). Amsterdam followed, and subsequently Nice, which 
left three treaties in the space of eight years. The Laeken summit of 2001 considered 
what was called the Nice leftovers; simplification, greater transparency, a bigger role 
for national parliaments, and subsidiarity; ensuring that decisions are taken at the 
lowest sensible level of government. This summit also summoned a convention for 
national governments, representatives of EU institutions and the public to discuss the 
future of Europe, a convention which was led by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The 
outcome was the drafting of a full-blown constitution, which was presented to 
another summit in 2003. In 2004, a text of the constitutional treaty was unanimously 
agreed on. The Treaty of Nice specified that the Commission to be chosen in 2009 
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should have fewer commissioners than member countries, and that the Treaty’s 
voting provisions extend only to Romania and Bulgaria. The absence of any new 
treaty could therefore become a big obstacle to further enlargement (ibid).  
Financial concerns: the budget and weak economies 
Recent articles of the Economist (2007) state that the claims that the EU has been 
unable to function since the eastern enlargement are overblown (2007c). European 
enlargement remains on track, despite the continuing concerns over the further 
expansion to Romania and Bulgaria this year. Over the last few years, there has been 
agreement on a seven year budget, and there has been set out ambitious plans for an 
energy policy and for tackling climate change.    
There are clear signs that Europe’s economies have been underperforming 
(Economist 2007f), yet there are positive signs emerging. France and Germany’s 
economies are most notably gathering speed, and across Europe the mood is 
noticeably more optimistic than before. In 2006, the GDP for the EU as a whole grew 
by 2.9 %. The average unemployment fell to 7.5% (ibid). This optimism follows from 
a period of profound gloom, in which over the past decade GDP growth has been 
limited. The overall productivity rates stagnated, and unemployment has historically 
continued to stay high.   
When agreeing upon the financing package for 2007-13 in December 2005, a clause 
promising a thorough budgetary review in 2008 was included (Economist 2007a). 
This is now gaining a new significance. The Commission takes the financial 
consequences seriously. The EU budget, at just over €115 billion, is relatively small, 
accounting for just one per cent of the Union’s GDP. About half of the budget goes to 
the CAP, and another one-third goes to regional support, in particular on 
infrastructure spending, although nearly half of that regional money is taken by 
relatively rich countries. Only a tiny fraction of the budget is spent on projects that 
might further the Lisbon Agenda’s goal of promoting high-tech growth. Since 2003, 
most farm subsidies have been switched to direct payments, not linked to production 
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and therefore not trade-distorting (ibid). It is thus argued that “the time is ripe for 
another attack on the CAP and the way it is financed” (ibid). This offers a different 
reason for paying attention to the budget review; in that it could become linked to the 
faith of the constitution, and ultimately the sense of enlargement fatigue pervading 
the Union.  
The discussion of the media’s position on absorption capacity in terms of institutional 
and financial factors suggests that “the biggest failing of the EU has long been the 
gulf between the union, as both a project of integration and a set of institutions, and 
the mass of its citizens” (Economist 2007d). The rejection of the constitution was not 
only seen as an objection to the text in itself, but was also interpreted as an expression 
of a more general feeling of resentment towards the European project and its 
remoteness. The traditional response was to ignore such resentment as the EU was 
always an elite project; however ignoring people’s views is no longer tenable. 
Politicians have to be more responsive to voters, the Economist argues (2007), and 
leaders should spend less time attacking the European institutions and rather extolling 
the virtues of European enlargement. The spread of referenda may illustrate the need 
of European citizens to be repeatedly convinced that membership is favourable.  
The Economist proposes the following measures (2007d); firstly, the EU needs to 
show European citizens that the Union works. The area of foreign policy alone 
should convince more citizens of the benefits of an EU acting together as being able 
to do more than nation states alone. Secondly, measures to deal with the democratic 
deficit will be necessary. Eurosceptics make much of the European institutions’ lack 
of transparency and accountability as well as remoteness from the citizens. The 
Commission is “far away” from the citizens and unelected. Yet, compared with 
national governments, the “Brussels machinery is highly transparent and information 
is always easy to find” (ibid). In relation to accountability, the Commission answers 
not only to national governments, through the Council, but to the Parliament as well. 
It is argued that the Parliament has failed in establishing its legitimacy as the natural 
conduit connecting citizens to the European project. Few citizens know who their 
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MEP is and turnout at European elections are mostly low, and falling. Campaigns are 
fought on national, not European issues; and there are no clear signs of a European 
demos. Thirdly, the Economist states that the EU needs to give Europeans a new 
dream. The project of peace and prosperity is now taken for granted. For this, 
concerns for the environment or a more active foreign policy are suggested. 
4.4 Inside the core of Absorption Capacity: Legitimacy and 
Effectiveness 
This section will provide a conceptual discussion of absorption capacity, and discuss 
the way in which issues of legitimacy and effectiveness are inherently important in 
the concept of absorption capacity. This section will introduce the theoretics behind 
the concepts of legitimacy and effectiveness in order to better understand the 
importance of absorption capacity in current EU discourse. I will argue that problems 
relating to legitimacy and effectiveness in particular have contributed to the sense of 
enlargement fatigue in the EU, which in turn has introduced absorption capacity into 
the discussion. Yet, up until now, there seems to have been more weight on 
legitimacy than on effectiveness in the discourse.   
The EU represents a political system which interconnects various member states. 
Governance within the EU goes hand in hand with discussions of effectiveness. 
Managing an increasing number of members will depend on the EU’s ability to 
absorb them, which in turn poses serious questions about how effective an enlarged 
EU can be. The EU is also dependent on support from the governed, and as such, 
issues of legitimacy are also imperative. The EU is not static, but ever changing; both 
in geographic terms as well as being subject to major changes in expansion of powers 
and jurisdiction. This allows for the continual questioning of the authority and 
accountability (Beetham & Lord 1998:15).  
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4.4.1 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been understood in various ways in different settings. 
Acknowledging its complexity and range of factors, be they rules, normative beliefs, 
actions, or procedures that contribute to making political authority rightful, is a useful 
starting point for any analysis of the concept (ibid:5). In relation to EU matters, 
legitimacy is inevitably discussed in connection to issues of democracy and 
governance, often leading to debates over the “democratic deficit” of the EU. 
The basis for any discussion on the concept of legitimacy should, according to 
Beetham & Lord (1998:123), be the recognition of the fact that a government is 
involved in producing rules and regulations, as well as distributing burdens and 
benefits, all of which for those under its authority. These actions may involve 
coercion or restrictions on their liberty, as well as the imposition of possible costs; 
and therefore they require substantial justification. In interpreting legitimacy, three 
dimensions should be distinguished in order to understand political authority as 
legitimate (ibid: 3). Firstly, political authority is legitimate when it is acquired and 
exercised according to established rules. Secondly, legitimacy follows when the said 
rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs about the rightful source of 
authority and the proper standards of government and lastly, when positions of 
authority are confirmed by the consent or affirmation of appropriate subordinates, as 
well as by recognition of other legitimate authorities. The first concept of legitimacy 
has a focus on rules and is thus about legality, the second stresses justifications based 
on beliefs and as such dealing with normative justifiability, and the last one on 
consent or recognition; legitimation. The respective negative sides to these different 
concepts of legitimacy are, in the first illegitimacy or breach of the rules, in the 
second; legitimacy deficit in weak justifications and in the third; contested beliefs and 
delegitimation or withdrawal of consent or recognition. The EU’s institutions and 
procedures conform to the criteria of the constitutional rule of law, through a 
jurisdiction which recognised as binding by the legal systems of the member states 
(ibid:13). 
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Social scientists use the term differently from philosophers; as an attempt to analyse 
and understand the different forms of government and further how political order and 
also obedience are sustained (Weber 1978:212-215). This view does not so much 
stress the usage of the term to define or even justify some understood ideal criteria for 
rightful government. Thus, one can also find that different criteria will help point to 
or validate various kinds of governments. The degree of legitimacy of which a 
government depends, will help indicate or even explore the degree of support that 
said government can call upon (Beetham & Lord 1998:2). Following from this, one 
could argue that a ‘legitimacy deficit’ or ‘legitimacy crisis’ would appear when there 
is a substantial gap between principles and practise or between legitimising norms 
and the societal support for them. If this gap is to increase, it may herald political 
upheaval (Habermas 1976:1-8). This is what seems to have happened with the eastern 
enlargement, with questions over the legitimacy expanding the cultural and religious 
basis of the EU being challenged even stronger than before.  
The EU is often seen as a problem solving entity where utility refers to an effort to 
find effective solutions to concrete problems or dilemmas. As such, legitimation is 
sought by achieving an output that could be seen as beneficial to given interests and 
preferences. Values refer to an understanding of the ’good life’ grounded in the 
identity of a specific community. Policy is thus legitimised with reference to what is 
considered appropriate, given the conception of self in the group. Rights are referring 
to a set of principles mutually recognised. A policy could be legitimised with 
reference to principles that would be seen as ”just” by all parties, irrespective of their 
particular interests (Sjursen 2006a:9). In this sense, and as the debate over the eastern 
enlargement has been heavily concerned with values and identity; this has contributed 
to the introduction of the term absorption capacity. 
As legitimacy has several understandings, there are accordingly different ways in 
which the term could be operationalised. Since members of pluralist societies argue 
about the ‘right’ and the ‘good’, as well as ‘interests’ and ‘preferences’, their 
institutions often have to accommodate contradictory, yet equally reasonable, ideas of 
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what is needed for them to be legitimate (Rawls 1993:36). The solutions or 
propositions one comes to, must work both normatively and institutionally in that 
they have to be justifiable to those whose values are to be combined, compromised or 
even over-ruled. Additionally, the solutions will have to be potentially adequately 
operationalised in their viable institutions (Lord & Magnette 2002:1) 
The questioning of legitimacy in the EU 
Criticism of the EU is often related to the perceived lack of legitimacy in the Union. 
After enlargement, this seems more so than ever. It is important to note that 
enlargement in fact is legitimate, in that every expansion is agreed unanimously upon 
by all member states and with the assent of the European Parliament (Rehn 2006:5). 
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn emphasises the importance of taking into account 
the concerns of EU citizens with regard to the enlargement process. The 
Commissioner stresses that the enlargement process must “respect the absorption 
capacity of the EU and the capacity of the candidates to meet strict conditions” (Rehn 
2006:1). Rehn states further that the slow process of political development was 
fuelled by the disrupted referenda on the Constitutional Treaty (ibid). Members of the 
European Parliament have argued that the potential deadlock presented with the lack 
of ratification of a Constitutional Treaty is preventing the EU from increasing its 
absorption capacity (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2006).   
Rehn further argues that Europe needs to be both economic and political; economic 
reforms are needed to enhance the competitiveness of the EU, whereas political 
reforms would make the Union more effective and democratic. Indirectly, economic 
reforms could improve the general mood of Europe with a strengthened European 
economy, which in turn would increase the legitimacy of the EU. The great strength 
of the EU has been its ability to adapt to new circumstances. Although the integration 
project started in a very different context of post war reconciliation, it has adapted to 
meet the new challenges of globalisation. Rehn suggests further institutional reforms 
to make decision making more effective and fair. Enlargement could as such be the 
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answer to the economic problems; as mutually beneficial industrial restructuring 
inside an enlarged and competitive Europe, based on cross-national production 
networks, will create a win-win situation for old and new member states. Rehn notes 
that enlargement discussions should not be held hostage to a theological debate about 
the ideal shape of the perfect Union, or the final borders of Europe. One should 
continue to respect the principle of Article 49 of the EU’s Treaties, which states that 
any European country that respects and applies European values, especially 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, may apply for 
EU membership (Rehn 2006). 
The EU does not rest on one single principle of legitimacy (Lord & Magnette 
2002:26), as argued above. As the entity itself, legitimacy is a compromise built from 
a series of different foundational visions resting on a plurality of ideas about rightful 
exercise of political power (ibid). The theoretical problem is how a political system 
built on different legitimacy principles is able to deal with the contradictions between 
them. It is argued that this conflict need not be negative; deliberation of legitimacy 
principles nourishes societal education (ibid). Additionally, it ensures that the 
compromise made today does not close the options that future generations will have. 
Lord and Magnette (2002) understand legitimacy through five dimensions, the first of 
which is international legitimacy. This is indirect or derivative and depends on the 
legitimacy of the component states, its respect for their sovereignty and ability to 
serve their purposes. Secondly, they stress the parliamentary legitimacy; in that the 
Union requires legitimation by the elected parliamentary bodies, as well as to the 
member states; dual legitimation. Thirdly, a more technocratic type of legitimacy is 
suggested, as the EU would best be legitimated by giving its powers to independent 
actors whose main incentive is to deliver the goals with maximum effectiveness. 
Fourtly, legal and procedural legitimacy is pointed to; which can be seen as an 
extension to the international legitimacy; the EU is legitimate because it is properly 
established in the Treaties. Yet, the EU is not only given legal legitimacy on behalf of 
the initial contract signed by the member states, or its attentiveness to due process, 
but also in its capacity to generate a normative order that confers new rights and 
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entitlements on citizens. Lastly, there is corporate legitimacy, which involves the 
identification of those affected by its policies and including them in the design (ibid). 
Each principle implies a distinct account of what is needed to make the EU legitimate 
on the output and input sides of governance (Scharpf 1999), yet these dimensions are 
ideal types and the Union mixes and matches them. Enlargement threatens some of 
these different manifestations of European legitimacy. The procedural legitimacy of 
the EU conferring new rights to its citizens is controversial in eastern enlargement as 
the identity both in terms of religion and culture does not meet the concept of how the 
incumbent citizens viewed the EU.  
Beetham & Lord (1998:124) argues that a condition of ‘forced reflection’ over the 
possible justifications for political authority is a ‘chronic’ one in the EU, as the 
pressing question of its legitimacy is continuously present. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, one argues that the EU as such challenged our learned conceptions of 
how rightful authority lies within the people constituted as a nation, rather than cross-
nationally as is the case with the EU (ibid). Power was known to be exercised 
through familiar institutions of the nation-state. National governments still retain an 
important amount of citizens’ loyalties. This may be grounded in the historical, 
linguistic and educational life in the nation states which builds on a stronger national 
identity compared to the one found at the European level, perhaps especially as the 
membership of this entity is continually changing (ibid). Therein exists a substantial 
gap that needs bridging; between the political requirement for a governmental 
authority beyond the nation state, and the popular support for that authority. A second 
reason why legitimacy is still debated has to do with its expanding authority and its 
repeated change, as it takes over tasks that previously were the domains of the 
member states. The development of the EU, functionally as well as geographically, 
makes questions of legitimacy necessary; how should its authority be exercised and at 
what level and how will it govern more effectively? In parallel to this is the frequent 
questioning of the effectiveness of the different EU institutions, in achieving the 
goals assigned to them. At decision making level, there is a yearning for rules and 
policies that are uniform, coherent and practicable, but which at the same time are 
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considerate to national differences and particularities (ibid). Thirdly, legitimacy 
remains subject for questioning as there is a widespread perception of a deficiency in 
its democratic credentials; by whom the decision makers are authorised, in what 
sense they are representative, and to whom they are accountable (ibid:126).    
4.4.2 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is the other important cause for concern in relation to EU expansion, 
with officials and the public alike worried that an enlarged Union in its functioning 
will cease to be as effective in producing outputs for European citizens. In relation to 
absorption capacity, effectiveness is to a substantial degree associated with 
institutional problems such as disagreements over qualified majority voting versus 
the use of the consensus principle and problems surrounding the budget.  
The problem of absorption capacity relates to the institutional factors outlined above 
in that it is concerned with the issue of organising consensus building. After 
enlargement, the fear is that the EU institutions will be incapable of representing all 
EU members, and that the sheer number of members will endanger the working 
capacity of all EU agencies and institutions (Vobruba 2003:41). For this, the 
Parliament suggests, in accordance with the failed constitutional treaty, an extended 
use of QMV decisions. 
Effectiveness in a political system of decision-making is determined by the system’s 
ability to apply measures to meet its preferred goals, and at a minimum expenditure 
of costs (Førland & Claes 2002:120). This poses demands to all parts of the decision 
making process, from the initiative to the decision to the implementative phase. For 
decision making to be effective, it needs be based on relevant information (ibid). The 
ideal of consensus in decision making ultimately means that each single country’s 
resistance to a particular issue can easily slow down the progress (ibid), and the 
welcoming of 12 new states through eastern enlargement led to concerns that this 
would in fact happen more often. 
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The effectiveness of a political system relates to its capacity of producing tangible 
results in various policy areas. Public support may derive from a balance between 
citizens’ demands and the system’s capacity to satisfy these demands. A political 
system which does not produce results will lose public support (Karlsson 2001:123). 
The capacity to solve problems; the effectiveness of a political system is therefore a 
crucial part of the system’s governance (ibid: 162). Scharpf (1996:138), in 
conceptualising democracy, stresses the out-put related dimension of governance; 
“where the effectiveness of democratically legitimated policy choices tends towards 
zero, so too democracy comes to an end”. In avoiding the end of democracy, 
safeguarding effectiveness is paramount (Karlsson 2001:162). As such, the 
relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness is inseparable. 
There are a number of institutional implications which enlargement poses, directly 
linked to the effectiveness of the EU institutions. Firstly, the rising committee size 
following from enlargement has prompted concerns of loss of effectiveness 
(Monitoring European Integration 3 1992:95). The membership of the European 
policy bodies has hitherto been determined by the principle of member state 
representation. Consequently, any enlargement by n countries implies increasing the 
number of members in existing policy bodies by at least n. Yet, when Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain became members, the number of EC Commissioners rose by 
four, providing Spain with two Commissioners as it was considered a large country, 
like France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Eastern enlargement further fuelled the fear 
that the increasing size of the EU would inflate the membership of these bodies 
beyond a size of effectiveness. There has also been concerns over the current design, 
and whether it accommodates the capacity needed to cope with the increasing 
membership base. It has been suggested that the principle of ‘denationalizing’ from 
committee membership could be applied to limit the Commission’s size to an 
effective level. This implies that the commissioner is appointed on the basis of her 
professionalism rather than nationality (ibid: 103). In general, the increase in the 
number of members of a committee will raise the costs of its organisation and, in 
particular, the minimum duration of meetings (ibid: 96). Theories of organisation 
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suggest that the effectiveness of decision-making is reduced by rising committee size 
when members hold the same rights to propose motions. More importantly, the 
effectiveness of the committee work, ie the quality of accepted policies, is likely to 
suffer markedly if committee size extends beyond a certain level (ibid). The larger the 
group, then the more likely is it that the group cohesiveness suffers, and the less 
transparent the process of decision making becomes. An increasing size of members 
will also make face-to-face communication more difficult which further increases the 
probability that fractions might emerge. In conclusion, the emergence of consensus 
becomes less likely (ibid). Enlargement may therefore be a case for concern, if it will 
drive the size of the bodies away from an optimal level (ibid: 97).   
Eichengreen & Frieden (1998:297) argue that the effectiveness problem partly stems 
from the fact that there exists no effective parliamentary control of the Council, 
which would act as a European government in areas where the EU has exclusive 
competences. Although the Maastricht Treaty enhanced the power of the European 
Parliament, this still provides an obvious lack of democratic legitimacy; which will 
increase accordingly if the tasks of the EU and the number of members are growing 
at simultaneous rates. 
In order to increase the effectiveness of the Union, one should have to move in a 
greater manner away from the principle of unanimity in decision-making, and to a 
larger extent make decisions through majority voting. This is reflected in the 
Commission and the Parliament’s suggested measures, and was suggested in the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
4.4.3 Conclusion: legitimacy and effectiveness 
The factors assessed here point to the fact that legitimacy and effectiveness are at the 
core of the sense of enlargement fatigue which pervades the EU, and in turn the 
introduction of absorption capacity into the EU discourse. As argued in chapter one, a 
high degree of legitimacy in concert with a high degree of effectiveness is expected to 
lead to a large degree of absorption capacity within the EU. This conceptual section 
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suggests that the EU faces major challenges both to its legitimacy and its 
effectiveness, suggesting that absorption capacity in the Union may currently be at a 
low ebb. This was especially considered so in terms of legitimacy, as is illustrated in 
the recent rejection of the European Constitution. After the French and Dutch “no” to 
the Constitution, the Commission launched a “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate”, a call for action to reduce the gap between the EU and its citizens. This plan 
conveys two important aspects; a feeling that the voice of each citizen counts in 
Europe and a focus on the satisfaction of European citizens with the way democracy 
works in the EU and in their own country.  
The Union clearly realises that effectiveness is of more concern at the present 
moment than legitimacy. Yet, it has argued that; “for enlargement to be a success, the 
EU must ensure the support of its citizens (…) Democratic legitimacy thus remains 
essential for the EU accession process” (European Commission 2006c). The debates 
over the effectiveness and legitimacy have both heralded concerns. Yet, the 
Commission particularly points to effectiveness as more crucial at this point in time. 
This would point towards a higher degree of absorption capacity in terms of the EU’s 
legitimacy. The hypotheses suggested by this conceptual discussion will be attempted 
tested empirically in the next chapter, to see whether they are indeed a correct 
analysis of the contributing factors which are at the core of the emergence of the 
concept of absorption capacity. 
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5. Empirical Analysis of Absorption Capacity in the 
EU 
Following from the previous conceptual chapter, I shall in this chapter try to test the 
present state of absorption capacity in the EU. Is the state of absorption capacity as 
critical as the discourse surrounding it may have indicated? In my attempt to examine 
the actual level of absorption capacity, I shall follow the Commission and the 
Parliament’s focus on legitimacy and effectiveness. These shall be examined using 
Eurobarometer surveys and the Internal Market Scoreboard respectively, in order to 
assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU after enlargement. It shall be argued 
that the state of absorption capacity indeed is of a satisfactory level to facilitate 
further enlargement and belies the sense of enlargement fatigue in the Union. It shall 
further be     argued throughout the analysis that absorption capacity is more of a 
result of concerns over the legitimacy than effectiveness, at least for the time being. 
The proposed enlargements to Croatia and Turkey, however, may prove to be a 
severe challenge to the absorption capacity of the EU, with fears arising that this may 
lead to the reduced functionality of the Union. 
This March, the EU marked the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. Yet, “the 
successful club celebrates (…) in a sombre mood” (Economist 2007b). A recent poll 
published in the Financial Times (Parker 2007), conducted in Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain, revealed that even in these prosperous countries, 44 % of 
those asked stated that life had “got worse since their country joined the EU”(ibid). 
This is of course not a reflection of the entire EU’s position, yet it may illustrate an 
overall sense of fatigue within the Union. When asked what one first associated with 
the EU, 31% answered the Single market, and only 7% answered peace, as many as 
thought inequality. This reflects, some suggest, the fact that leaders so far have failed 
to portray an EU with its foundational basis in freedom. In a similar vein, there have 
been recent widespread claims that the EU is in need of something that excites people 
more, comparable to that of the peace project of the post world war two era. As Ash 
(2007b) argues, the EU now needs an inspiring vision of where it is heading to. 
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A recent Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 2006a) shows that support for 
membership of the European Union has improved. Overall, 55% of European citizens 
say that their country’s membership in the EU is ‘a good thing’ (EU25) (ibid). The 
Irish and the Dutch are the more positive of the Europeans; 77% and 74% 
respectively agree with this statement. Spanish citizens are also positive (72%). On 
the opposite side of the spectrum, Austrians are the most negative; only 34% claim 
their country’s membership is ‘a good thing’, with Latvia (37%), Finland (39%) and 
the UK (42%) following suit (ibid). Still, this indicates a general increase, as in 2004, 
only 48% of Europeans of the EU15 agreed with this statement (Eurobarometer 
2004). This shows a discrepancy of 7 percentage points. Yet, one should note that the 
numbers from 2004 are of the EU of 15 states, the 2006 ones of the EU25 countries.  
The 2006 survey further shows that life satisfaction in European member states 
remains high, and demonstrates little change over time; 81% of Europeans are 
satisfied13 with the lives they lead. This has overall remained unchanged since 2004 
(81% in Eurobarometer 62 in Eurobarometer 2006a). There is a 13 percentage points 
divergence between the new member states and EU15; 70% of the former say they 
are satisfied, whereas the figure for the EU15 countries is 83% (ibid). There is further 
a slight increase in support for the perceived advantages of EU membership (ibid). In 
2004 (Eurobarometer 2004), 47% of the respondents said their country benefits from 
being a member of the EU, a number which increased (+7) to 54% in 2006 
(Eurobarometer 2006a). Conversely, the percentages of people who thought that their 
countries do not benefit from membership were 35% in 2004 and 33% in 2006. The 
degree of citizens who think their country benefits from EU membership has thus 
increased at the same time as we see a decline in respondents who believe the 
opposite. 
Still, support for further enlargement of the EU is now less widespread than before (-
4 points (2005)); only 45% supports further enlargement (Eurobarometer 2006a). 
                                              
13 The percentages for respondents who have answered ”very”(21%) and ”fairly” satisfied (60%) are added here. 
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Additionally, the gap between support and opposition is shrinking, 42% say they are 
opposed to the prospect of further enlargement of the EU. Yet, the support is stronger 
than in 2004, as the figure below illustrates.   
Support for further enlargement
QA30.4. What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each 
statement, whether you are for or against it. Further enlargement of the European Union to 

















Figure 5.1.      (Sources: Eurobarometer 2004, 2006a) 
This figure shows an increase of 8 percentage points of the number of respondents 
positive to further enlargement, yet only a 1 percentage point decrease in Europeans 
reported they were opposed to further enlargement. This means that there was also a 
smaller percentage who responded “don’t know” in 2006; 13% vis-à-vis 20% in 2004 
(Eurobarometer 2004, 2006a). It may be worthy to note that the field work for the 
2004 survey was conducted between February and March 2004, at a time when the 
EU was preparing for the Eastern accessions of May the same year, which in turn 
may have contributed to the numbers somewhat. It is also important to note here that 
the survey of 2004 was conducted in an EU of 15 members, whereas the one from 
2006 introduces the viewpoint of the EU25. Yet, the ten new member states that were 
included in the 2006 survey were overall more positive towards further enlargement 
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(66% in favour). This highlights the persistence in the diversity of opinions on the 
geographical evolution of the EU. 
All in all, these four measures together; the support for membership of the EU, the 
life satisfaction of European citizens, the perceived benefits from EU membership 
and the slightly increased support for further EU enlargement, despite the concerns 
regarding proposed Turkish membership, all indicate that the current level of 
absorption capacity is not as critical as it may have appeared in the conceptual 
discussion that preceded this empirical analysis.  
5.1 Legitimacy – Eurobarometer Surveys 
In order to examine the level of legitimacy regards enlargement in Europe, the 
Eurobarometer surveys 61(2004), 65(2006a) and the Special Eurobarometer survey 
255(2006b) will be used. These represent European citizens’ views on enlargement 
prior to the eastern expansion and after, as the Eurobarometer survey 61 was 
conducted in February to March 2004, and the 65 survey was the most recent 
Eurobarometer survey available at the start of writing this thesis. The survey of 2004 
is used because it reflects the point in time when absorption capacity dramatically 
entered the EU discourse, and shall be contrasted with where it stands in 2006, 
enabling one to explore different aspects at the root of enlargement fatigue and the 
introduction of the concept of absorption capacity.  
Regards public opinion, the European citizens’ image of the EU has overall improved 
significantly (Eurobarometer 2006a). One out of two citizens (50%) living in the EU 
has a positive image of the Union, whereas one in three has an indifferent (33%) 
perception of it. In 2004, only 44% of Europeans held a positive image of the EU 
(Eurobarometer 2004). Again, the Irish are today the more positive in their views of 
the Union (73%), whereas the opinion is very low in Austria (32%) (ibid).  
In terms of whether Europeans feel their voice counts in the EU, over half of the 
respondents (54%) disagree with this, representing a 5 percentage points decline from 
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the 2005 survey (59%) (ibid). Citizens of the Netherlands and Luxembourg are the 
more positive of Europeans, at 54% and 53% respectively (ibid). This contrasts with 
the European average of 36%. Additionally, there is also a slight improvement in the 
levels of trust in the EU (ibid). Whereas only 41% of the respondents in 2004 agreed 
that they ‘tend to trust’ the EU, this number increased to 48% in 2006. The intensity 
of this however, differs strongly between countries; from widespread levels of trust in 
Hungary (70%), to only 31% in the UK (ibid). The EU25 average of 48%, however, 
shows that even after enlargement to the east, there is a general increase in the trust of 
the EU. 
The Special Eurobarometer Survey 255 (2006b) presents some socio-demographic 
variables. Regarding gender specific differences, it seems that men (47%) are slightly 
more positive to enlargement than women (43%). Age and education also seem to 
provide significant variations regards enlargement, in that with increasing age, the 
less positive the respondents are to enlargement. Of respondents in the age cohort of 
15-24, 56% say they are positive, compared to only 35% of those of the age of 55 and 
above. Education is another variable; it seems the better educated the respondent, the 
more positive she will be to enlargement14 (ibid). Lastly, political views seem to 
contribute significantly to one’s view of enlargement, in that people on the left (50%) 
“tend to endorse the accession of future member states more than people on the right 
(42%)”15 (ibid). 
In what follows, the political, social, and economic aspects of enlargement will be 
discussed and how in turn European citizens view these. This is important because 
these aspects are closely related to the perceived legitimacy of the EU, and in turn 
how large the degree of absorption capacity is. I shall suggest that the European 
population is increasingly divided when one goes from political to social to economic 
                                              
14 51% of those who left full time education at 20 or later, as well as those who are still studying (59%), compared to those 
who left school at 15 (35%). 
15 ”In political matters people talk of ”the left” and ”the right”. How would you place your views on this scale? Left (1) to 
right (10).”  
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factors of enlargement. There is little disagreement over the positive effects of the 
political aspects of enlargement, social aspects are slightly more controversial, yet the 
disagreements are clearest when dealing with the economic effects of enlargement. 
Following from this, one can tentatively suggest that the problem of absorption 
capacity stems mostly from economic factors and fears regarding the economy. 
5.1.1 Political, social, and economic concerns 
In this section, the Standard Eurobarometer survey 65(2006a) and the Special 
Eurobarometer survey 255(2006b) will mainly be used in the analysis, given that the 
purpose is to examine the status of absorption capacity in the EU today. Yet, numbers 
from Eurobarometer 61(2004) will still be used where this contributes to the 
argument in order to provide a comparative perspective to the time when absorption 
capacity emerged.  
Political aspects 
I start here from the position that the political aspects of enlargement will be 
important in how the absorption capacity of the EU can be examined. As argued 
above, European citizens seem overall to be in favour of enlargement. Citizens are 
positive to the favourable impact of enlargement in political terms, such as the 
ensuring of peace and stability in Europe, the strengthening of the EU’s role on the 
international scene, as well as enlargement’s role in promoting democracy in the 
European continent (all 67%) (Eurobarometer 2006b).  
How then, do European citizens view enlargement? I will tentatively suggest that 
concerns over the Union’s absorption capacity would be reflected in a limited degree 
of support for enlargement. The recent Special Eurobarometer survey (ibid) states in 
relation to the general perceptions of EU enlargement that around two-thirds of 
European citizens agree with the universal ideas that inspire the enlargement of the 
EU in general (2006b:20). Further, 63% of respondents state that enlargement 
strengthens the EU. In every single member state, over half of the respondents agree 
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with this. Overall, the acceding countries of Bulgaria and Romania, together with 
Croatia and the ten eastern states, show stronger enthusiasm for enlargement than the 
EU15. Again, the most negative country is Austria (ibid). 
Public opinion on how democracy works has reached the most positive level in the 
last ten years. On average, one in two (50%) (EU15: 48%, New Member States: 59%) 
of people are satisfied with how democracy works within the Union, whereas just 
over one third (34%) is unsatisfied. In 2004, only 43% of the respondents claimed 
they were satisfied with this (40% dissatisfied) (Eurobarometer 2004). Yet, European 
citizens have overall more trust in EU institutions (48%, EU15: 45%, NMS: 60%) 
than in their national parliaments (38%) and governments (35%).  
The sharp variations in some member states may be understood by the fact that 
European integration in general is perceived a controversial issue in particular 
member states. In countries such as Denmark and the UK, there has traditionally been 
strong resistance towards the EU at the elite level (Karlsson 2001:117), which may 
help mobilising negative attitudes also at the citizen level. 
There are additional political benefits following from enlargement which are of 
importance to the legitimacy of the EU. Firstly the fact that citizens generally believe 
that enlargement could lead to a real political unification of the European continent 
(62%). Secondly, there is also a widespread belief that enlargement increases the 
protection of human rights and minorities of the EU (Eurobarometer 2006b:36).   
Social aspects 
In addition to the political aspects, social features are important when dealing with 
issues of legitimacy. The social aspects divide European citizens more than the 
political aspects, yet less than economic issues. Overall, these concerns apply equally 
to citizens of both the old and new member states. The main concerns regarding 
social aspects are, according to the respondents, the perceived increases in crime, 
illegal immigration and settlement of workers from other or future member states. 
Issues of cultural diversity and mobility also divide European citizens.  
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Regards cultural diversity, seven out of ten (71%) Europeans agree that enlargement 
enriches the cultural diversity of Europe. Only 48% objected to the disappearance of 
cultural identities and traditions (ibid:54). The vast majority of respondents (82%) 
agree that enlargement facilitates the mobility of people like students and 
businessmen within Europe, and recognise the positive value of this. At the same 
time, however, 60% believe enlargement increases illegal immigration in Europe. 
The survey states that several of the EU15 states are more affected by illegal 
immigration, as people from poorer countries hope to attain a better life in a shorter 
period of time in these countries (ibid:56). Close to three quarters of the Europeans 
polled (73%) think that enlargement increases the settlement of workers from future 
member states in the EU. Yet, a majority believes that enlargement ensures better 
integration of populations from these countries in the EU (57%) (ibid:58).  
Economic aspects 
According to the Special Eurobarometer survey on enlargement (2006b), economic 
factors cause most concern among European citizens. Public opinion is more divided 
on economic benefits than on both political and social aspects following from 
enlargement. In fact, EU citizens seem to attach economic disadvantages to this, 
being under the impression that enlargement has a general negative impact on the 
EU’s as well as the individual member states’ economies. Still, not all Europeans 
conform to this view (ibid). 
Europeans are not “totally convinced that a larger EU would have a better chance of 
meeting the challenges of globalisation”, or that enlargement will enhance the EU’s 
capacity to compete with other international players. Many Europeans fear that 
enlargement subsequently means increased labour transfer to countries where this is 
cheaper (ibid). The public opinion is further divided over whether enlargement of the 
EU generates opportunities or barriers for the European economy; 40% are of the 
opinion that enlargement decreases economic development in the EU as well as in the 
respondent’s home country, whereas 43% disagree with this. Yet, a majority of the 
European citizens (75%) agree with the labour transfer effect of enlargement, as the 
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Internal Market does indeed ensure a free movement of goods, services, people and 
capital; enabling the transfer of jobs from one country to another (ibid:45). 
The main concern of European citizens remains the fear of unemployment. In 2004 
(Eurobarometer 2004), 44% of respondents answered that the main problem their 
country was facing was unemployment. Crime was the second largest concern (26%), 
followed closely by the economic situation (25%), rising prices and inflation (18%) 
(ibid). Although crime is not directly linked to economic factors, it is kept in this 
presentation in order to show that the majority of the main fears are of an economic 
character. In 2006, unemployment was again the most important source for concern 
amongst Europeans (49%) (Eurobarometer 2006a). Crime was also in 2006 the 
second largest cause for concern, 24% (-1), and the economic situation again the third 
most important issue (23%). The concern over inflation was down to 13% in 2006 
(ibid). 
The fears provoked by the building of Europe include the transfer of jobs to other 
member countries where the production costs are lower (72%). The second biggest 
fear provoked by enlargement is that over the respondent’s country having to pay 
“more and more” to the EU (63%) (ibid). Around one-third of the respondents (35%) 
say they are “not afraid” of the increase in drug trafficking and international 
organised crime, about half (51%) are not afraid of the loss of power to smaller 
member states. Another 56% are not afraid of the loss of national identity and culture 
(ibid). 
On a more positive note, two-thirds of Europeans polled (66%) affirm the important 
role that enlargement plays in supporting the economic development of candidate and 
potential candidate countries. Still, this support could potentially burden the EU 
budget, as 57% of the EU25 population consider that the financial support of 
enlargement decreases budgetary resources for their country (ibid:47). However, the 
Eurobarometer survey emphasises that the amount spent on enlargement from the EU 
budget is lower than EU citizens perhaps assume. “The financial contribution by the 
old member states to enlargement remains limited; only 0.1% of their GDP” (ibid).  
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5.1.2 Legitimacy in the EU 
The Eurobarometer surveys show that whereas support for membership of the EU 
improves, the support for further enlargement weakens. Support for EU membership 
is now 55% (+5), and the score for the perceived benefits following from this is at 
54% (+2). According to half of the respondents of the survey, the EU’s image is 
positive. These measures all paint a more positive picture of the present state of 
legitimacy in the EU. It is noteworthy that, with perhaps the exception of Austria and 
the UK, European citizens are overall expressing positive attitudes to enlargement of 
the Union. This may imply that the perceived enlargement crisis in fact is 
exaggerated. In comparison to the survey of 2004, there also seems to be a decline in 
negativity over the last years. Still, the picture is not a uniform one: the gap between 
the supporters (45%) and the opponents (42%) of further enlargement is still very 
small.  
The Eurobarometer findings suggest that economic factors would seem to be the 
main concerns contributing to legitimacy concerns, still the overall legitimacy within 
the EU seems to be at a satisfactory level. As such, one may suggest that the 
absorption capacity within the Union, at least in relation to legitimacy, is not as 
troublesome as indicated previously.  
5.2 Effectiveness – Internal Market Scoreboard 
I have argued that effectiveness is a central factor in the understanding of the term 
absorption capacity. In order to examine the present state of effectiveness and 
absorption capacity within the Union, the Internal Market Scoreboard (European 
Commission 2006e) and the Commission’s General Report of the Activities of the 
European Union16 (European Commission 2007a) from 2006 will be used.  
                                              
16 The Commission’s General Report on the Activities of the Union presents particular measures of the production of the 
Union, yet as it has not been possible to find comparable numbers from previous years, these have not been used in the 
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At the most basic level, evaluating effectiveness will involve comparing something, 
preferably against some standard of accomplishment (Underdal 1992:2). I shall look 
at the numbers of implementation procedures in 2006, with the point of comparison 
being the years prior to eastern enlargement. The evidence will show how 
effectiveness measured in this manner appears worse in 2002, when contrasted with 
2006. As such this chapter will argue that the EU has not compromised its 
effectiveness following the expansion to the east. 
The General Report of the Activities of the EU (European Commission 2007a) argues 
that the activity of the EU in 2006 was in many respects formed by the Lisbon agenda 
of the previous year, which was to “provide the basis for a genuine partnership for 
growth and employment”(ibid:13). The agenda generated a push factor for progress 
in several key areas and provided good grounds for growth. One of the main points 
made concerned better regulation, which is regarded as a joint responsibility 
involving not only the Commission, but also other European institutions as well as 
the member states themselves (ibid). As a result of the agreement on the common 
approach, the European Parliament and the Council initiated impact assessments, 
welcoming the simplification process. The abolishing of instruments that are no 
longer part of the active acquis has begun, as has the process of codifying 
Community acts, in order to reduce their volume. The codification programme covers 
approximately 500 legislative acts, and 85 of these have been finalised by the 
Commission. 52 of these are already adopted. These 85 replace 300 existing pieces of 
legislation (ibid:22). Overall, the 500 acts that are covered by the programme shall in 
turn replace about 2000 instruments in all, which the Commission plans to complete 
by 2008. These are all measures taken to improve the current effectiveness of the EU. 
                                                                                                                                           
analysis. Yet, for further reference: the Commission met 43 times in 2006, sent 482 proposals for directives, regulations 
and decisions, and made 7 recommendations. It also presented 324 communications and reports and 10 Green Papers and 
two White Papers. The Parliament exercised 158 consultations, 13 approved co-decisions, 90 resolutions and 140 own 
initiative procedures.  
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5.2.1 The Internal Market Scoreboard 
In the following, the Internal Market Scoreboard shall be used as a measure of the 
effectiveness of the EU. The scoreboard monitors how quickly each of the member 
states transposes Internal Market directives into national law and also highlights the 
number of infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission against each 
member state. The most recent of the Commission’s scoreboards state that the 
European member states have never performed better in implementing the agreed 
internal market rules into national law than in 2006.  
For the very first time, 2006 saw an average transposition deficit falling below the 
interim target of 1.5%, a target agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government in 
2001. The 2006 figure of 1.2 % is “well below” that level (ibid: 3). The effort is on 
the whole driven by all member states, even though the newer member states perform 
better with an average deficit of 0.9%. Every single member state made progress in 
2006, and 19 of the EU members are below or have reached the 1.5% target, another 
two are only one directive short of doing so. Subsequently, only four states are well 
above the target; in descending order, these are Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, and 
Italy.  
The number of directives to be transposed in 2006 was lower than in recent years; 
still it is comparable to that of 2002 and before. Yet, the average transposition deficit 
today is much lower than it was (ibid). Regards the directives to be transposed in the 
close future, Luxembourg, Belgium and Cyprus seem to be best prepared as they 
have already transposed a large number of these. 
There have been recent calls from the EU’s leaders urging the states to improve their 
transposition records, and subsequent to this an interim target of 1.5% transposition 
deficit was set. In December 2006, the average deficit for the year was announced 
under the heading “best result ever!” (ibid: 5). The average deficit for the EU 25 was 
1.2%, the EU15 1.5%. Compared to 1999, the deficit was an average of 6.3%, which 
fell to 2.0% in 2001, increasing to 2.9% in 2004. As such, the percentage of 2006 is 
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the best recorded yet. Still, “the ultimate goal obviously remains that all member 
states transpose Internal Market legislation before the deadlines”, and that there 
should be no deficit at all. Nevertheless, this shows a remarkable improvement.   
Performance wise, 21 member states are below or very close to the 1.5% 
transposition deficit target. 19 Member states are well below the target, whereas 2 of 
these member states are very close; Belgium and the Czech Republic respectively 
(ibid: 6). In these countries’ cases, only one out of 1634 directives needs to be 
transposed to reach the target. Denmark and Lithuania are the best performers, and 
are only 5 directives away from a 0% deficit (ibid). There are only four countries that 
lag relatively far behind the others, the worst of these is Poland, which is closely 
followed by Greece, Luxembourg, and Italy. The first two of these are the most 
worrying, as their deficits are the double of the European average (Greece 3.8%, 
Portugal 3.0%).  
The Scoreboard presents an explanation as to why all of the member states have 
performed better. All states, without exception, have made substantial progress in the 
last six months. Even if the number of directives to be transposed in the last six 
months was lower than in previous years, it is now back to the level of 2002 and 
preceding years. Yet, the average transposition deficit today is much lower than it 
was in those years. The reduced number of directives to be transposed in 2006 is a 
factor in to the explanation of the positive progress of the member states. Yet, the 
primary reason for the substantial overall progress made is the implementation of the 
best practises set out in the 2004 Commission Recommendation. 
The average number of implemented recommendations per member state is up from 
below 15 to 17 out of a total of 23 recommendations in half a year (ibid:7). Given the 
excellent performance of the member states, the level of fragmentation has also been 
reduced to its lowest level ever (ibid: 8). Still, further efforts are needed to further 
reduce these; as the “failure to transpose a directive that has been transposed in all the 
other member states holds the Internal Market hostage to one member state’s inability 
to transpose directives” (ibid).  
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5.2.2 Effectiveness of the EU 
The Internal Market plays a key role in achieving the EU’s objective of creating more 
growth and jobs (European Commission 2007b). Yet, it will only function properly 
and reach its full potential if the legislation reached at European level is implemented 
effectively (ibid). The benefits following from being a part of the Internal Market are 
not delivered automatically. EU rules must be adopted, transposed into national law 
and enforced. The Scoreboard monitors whether the member states are doing what is 
needed to ensure that the Internal Market functions properly (ibid:4). If the rules are 
not applied effectively, their contribution to Europe’s growth and competitiveness is 
undermined. As such, the economic interests of all the member states will deteriorate 
if some of them do not deliver (ibid). 
The effectiveness of the EU, given the Internal Market Scoreboard and the General 
Report, does not seem to have suffered after enlargement. It would, from what has 
been argued above, seem hard to see a sense of enlargement fatigue emerging from 





In this thesis, I have attempted to explore the introduction of the concept of 
absorption capacity into the discourse surrounding the European Union. A study into 
the term was called for by the EU given the ambiguity surrounding it and the negative 
connotations of the term’s usage. As such, I have attempted to explore the life, 
meaning and future of the concept within the European enlargement debate. 
Enlargement, through the course of this study, has emerged as the most significant 
factor in interpreting absorption capacity’s resurgence in the current EU. I have 
argued that the problems over enlargement suggest that two main themes are at the 
core of absorption capacity: legitimacy and effectiveness. I have suggested that 
despite the tendency from the Commission and the Parliament to focus more on 
concerns of effectiveness, when empirically measured, concerns over legitimacy 
appear more important than effectiveness in contributing to the sense of fatigue 
surrounding the EU, and in turn the emergence of the concept of absorption capacity. 
The focus of my argument has been threefold. Firstly, based on the historic 
discussion, I have argued that absorption capacity has had little prominence as a 
concept within the EU. This changed with the eastern enlargement of 2004, where 
increasing public and academic interest pointed towards enlargement fatigue and the 
subsequent coining of the term absorption capacity and following from this, 
clarification and definition of the term were sought. Secondly, I have suggested that 
there now is a consensus on the actual concerns which enlargement brings. These are 
concerns which the Union cannot afford to ignore, or to reject as nonsense or as only 
a concept used strategically by those opposed to further enlargement. Thirdly, based 
on an empirical assessment of the EU’s performance in terms of legitimacy and 
effectiveness, I have suggested that the absorption capacity of the EU is at a 
satisfactory and functional level. Nevertheless, the prospect of future enlargement 
still remains a controversial one.  
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Absorption Capacity does not accurately reflect enlargement fatigue 
In accordance with the Commission’s report and the resolution made by the 
Parliament, it has been suggested that the usage of the term absorption capacity may 
in itself be misleading, provoking negativity and providing justification and support 
for those opposed to further enlargement. Theoretically, this problem stems from the 
fact that absorption capacity is borrowed from club theory. Club theory stresses the 
obstacles any large club meets regards making decisions and conducting common 
policies. Essentially, when a club increases in size, the hindrances the club faces will 
increase too, and as such the benefits of club membership will become diluted. It is 
argued that this theory is ill-fitting in an EU context because in an EU setting, most 
benefits flow from following common rules, whose value increases as more people 
subscribe to them. These benefits are “network” benefits that increase with size, and 
not as absorption capacity suggests benefits that are based on the sharing of 
something with a fixed supply (Vibert 2006). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005:13) agree with this and argue that, according to club theory, an organisation 
will expand its institutions and membership, as for both the member state and the 
applicant the marginal benefits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs. In a club-
theoretical perspective, enlargement will therefore continue until marginal costs equal 
the marginal benefits. 
Nevertheless, it seems problematic to view the EU as a “network” only, and reject the 
potential “club” properties that it would seem to hold. Contrary to these arguments 
which dismiss absorption capacity and its basis in club theory as providing a 
misleading concept, it is important to note, as argued throughout this thesis, that the 
concerns over enlargement are very real ones, concerns which the EU even seems to 
have come to a consensus over. As such, there are aspects of the EU that do indeed 
resemble club properties, suggesting that it would be reductive to look at the EU 
simply as a network. The EU understood as a network suggests an indefinite 
membership, whereas the EU understood as a club would suggest that membership 
will be limited. Following the concerns regarding enlargement stressed in this thesis, 
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it may be suggested that one cannot view the EU as a “network” only; its membership 
is not necessarily “open”, as particularly concerns over Turkey show, and as such 
some club aspects do seem to be evident in the EU. Yet contrary to club theory, the 
EU has not yet come to a point where it will break down, the EU as a club still seems 
to function, and the utilities are not diminishing as quickly as the club-sceptics seem 
to believe. Thus, one should be careful to look upon absorption capacity as a way of 
stopping enlargement; perhaps the “greatest single achievement of the European 
Union” (ibid).  
Crucially, as argued by both the Commission and the Parliament, is the fact that the 
sense of enlargement fatigue is not accurately captured by the concept of absorption 
capacity. In this sense, the Economist coincides with the position recently taken by 
the European Union, arguing that ‘integrative capacity’ would better reflect the true 
nature of the debate over European enlargement. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been at the forefront of the criticisms of the EU in recent years. The 
general public may seem disillusioned with the European project (Economist 2007b). 
Yet, I have argued that European citizens overall seem relatively positive regards the 
benefits of European membership as well as the general support for membership 
itself. As argued above, legitimacy is paramount in the effective functioning of the 
EU, where the citizens may be geographically distanced from the fora of power.  
The perception that there exists a legitimacy crisis in the EU is often referred to 
without much evidence being presented in support of its existence. This, Karlsson 
argues (2001), may be the case partly because empirical data supporting this notion is 
hard to produce. But if we do examine the data available we discover that it seems as 
though the European project does in fact enjoy “fairly broad societal acceptance”. As 
argued above, it seems that legitimacy concerns pose larger problems than 
effectiveness regards the absorption capacity of the Union.  
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As argued in the empirical discussion, the measures of the increasing support for 
membership of the EU, the fact that the life satisfaction of European citizens remains 
high, the slight increase in the perceived benefits of the Union and the increased 
support for further enlargement compared to the figure of 2004, all suggest that the 
legitimacy of the EU remains adequate. 
Effectiveness 
In terms of effectiveness, one of the main reasons for the prominence of absorption 
capacity in EU discussions since the eastward enlargement has been economic 
factors. Although the state of European economies has improved recently, there are 
still grounds for concerns; Europe currently experiences slow growth and remarkably 
high unemployment rates. Yet, the EU alone cannot be held fully responsible for this. 
Nevertheless, the current economic situation does not contribute to a particularly 
positive attitude towards the single market, EU institutions, nor the European project 
in general.  
At present, the EU therefore faces two major challenges. Firstly, the Union needs to 
establish how to reinvigorate the European economy, and secondly it needs to 
provide measures which will strengthen societal support for enlargement (ibid). The 
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn has argued that more governmental efforts are 
needed to convince Europeans about the positive benefits reaped from membership in 
the club (ibid). As has been argued, the open door policy adopted by three member 
states of Ireland, Sweden, and the UK at the time of the accession of the ten eastern 
states provided significant economic gains, not only for the accession countries 
themselves, but also for the old member states, and particularly for the three countries 
that held the open door policy. Indeed, this enlargement wave contributed 
significantly to the strengthening of European economies that is now visible 
throughout Europe (ibid). 
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The perceived sense of enlargement fatigue, measured through legitimacy and 
effectiveness in this thesis, would in turn suggest that there is not a crisis of 
absorption capacity in the EU.  
The future of European enlargement  
The objectives of the EU have always been political as well as economic. Article A of 
the Treaty on European Union (1992), states that  
“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
amongst the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen”.  
Herein lays thus the moral obligation and the fundamental objective for enlargement. 
The will to enlarge has always been prominent, although this task may now seem 
more challenging than before.  
This thesis has shown how a sense of enlargement fatigue has manifested in concerns 
over the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the EU. These concerns are the main 
factors, it has been suggested, in the emergence of the concept of absorption capacity. 
Absorption capacity, I have argued, overstates these concerns, yet still threatens to 
overshadow future enlargements.  
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